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ABSTRACT
The thesis focuses on the sources of macroeconomic uctuations in ten (10)
selected African economies over the period 1990-2011. Data for the study
were obtained from the International Financial statistics (IFS), the World
Bank, and Central Bank database of the selected countries. We formulate
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the thesis. We
estimate the model using quarterly time series data. Due to data availability,
the sample size di¤ers from one country to the other. First, we investigate
the relative contributions of internal and external shocks to economic uc-
tuations in African economies. Second, we evaluate the signicance of the
balance sheet channel in African economies. Third, we investigate the ef-
fectiveness of sovereign wealth funds in reducing macroeconomic volatility
caused by commodity price shocks. The thesis has 5 chapters. Chapter 1 is
the general introduction. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are stand-alone related papers
on macroeconomic uctuations. Chapter 5 is the conclusion.
Chapter 1 introduces the study. We discuss the research problem, the moti-
vation, the objectives, and the research questions. We also explain both our
theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature. Moreover, we high-
light the signicance and the key ndings of the study. Finally, we conclude
the chapter with a brief outline on the organisation of the study.
Chapter 2 investigates the relative contributions of internal and external
shocks to macroeconomic uctuations in African economies. We formulate
and estimate a monetary DSGE model to examine the sources of economic
uctuations in ten African countries. The model is estimated with the
Bayesian technique using twelve macroeconomic variables. Generally, the
ndings indicate that both the internal and external shocks signicantly in-
uence output uctuations in African countries. Over a four quarter horizon,
internal shocks are dominant while over eight to sixteen quarter horizons, the
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external shocks are dominant. Among the external shocks, external debt, ex-
change rate, foreign interest rate and commodity price shocks account for a
large part of output variations in African economies. Money supply and
productivity shocks are the most important internal shocks contributing to
output uctuations in African countries. To ensure macroeconomic stability,
African countries need to formulate appropriate exchange rate and exter-
nal debt management policies, diversify the economies, and create sovereign
wealth funds (SWFs) or use hedging instruments.
Chapter 3 evaluates the quantitative signicance of the balance sheet chan-
nel in African economies. We construct an open economy monetary DSGE
model where entrepreneurs nance investment by issuing foreign currency-
denominated debt. The model is estimated with Bayesian technique. The
evidence suggests that the balance sheet e¤ects are empirically important in
African economies. The marginal likelihood results clearly favour the model
with nancial frictions. Moreover, the ndings indicate that the balance
sheet e¤ect reduces the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy, raises the sensitiv-
ity of the risk premium to external debt, and contracts output. This indi-
cates that exchange rate depreciation is contractionary in African economies.
We conclude that African countries should reduce their exposure to foreign
currency-denominated debt and also deepen their domestic bond markets.
Chapter 4 investigates the e¤ectiveness of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in
reducing macroeconomic volatility in commodity exporting African countries.
We formulate and simulate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model that features SWFs. The simulation results suggest that the creation
of SWFs can reduce macroeconomic volatility in commodity exporting coun-
tries. Particularly, SWFs can reduce government expenditure, real exchange
rate, and external debt volatility. Since these are the channels through which
commodity price shocks are transmitted to the African economies, we rec-
ommend that African countries should create SWFs to sterilize the inow of
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commodity revenue and to prevent the resource curse problem.
Chapter 5 concludes the study. We summarize the key ndings in Chapters
2, 3, and 4. We highlight the policy implications of our ndings. Finally, we
suggest areas for further research.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
1.1 Background to the study
Sharp and persistent economic uctuations are one of the major problems
facing developing and emerging economies. Macroeconomic uctuations neg-
atively a¤ect investment in human capital, reduce private investment, hinder
economic growth, reduce societal welfare, and increase poverty rate in devel-
oping countries (see Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Hausmann and Gavin, 1996;
Flug et al. 1998; Aizenman and Marion, 1999; Pallage and Robe, 2003; Imbs,
2007; Berument et al., 2012). In particular, macroeconomic instability has
been reported to adversely a¤ect growth and welfare in African countries (see
Guillamont et al, 1999; Loayza et al., 2007).
The ndings, however, on the sources of economic uctuations in develop-
ing economies have been rather divergent. For example, Ho¤maister and
Roldós (2001) and Raddatz (2007) nd that domestic shocks are the main
sources of output uctuations in developing countries. Ho¤maister et al.
(1997) nd that domestic shocks account for signicant output variations
in Africa. Jidoud (2012) shows that productivity shocks are the dominant
sources of output volatility in Côte dIvoire. In contrast, Mendoza (1995),
and Agénor et al. (1999) nd that terms of trade shocks signicantly a¤ect
output uctuations in developing countries. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and
Uribe and Yue (2006) nd that foreign interest rate shocks inuence eco-
nomic uctuations in emerging economies. Similarly in Africa, Bleaney and
Greenaway (2001) nd that trade shocks signicantly explain output uc-
tuations in Africa. Raddatz (2008) shows that the relative importance of
external shocks as sources of output instability in Africa has increased since
the 1990s.
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Moreover, studies have shown that relatively small shocks can be transmit-
ted and amplied in emerging economies through the nancial market im-
perfection (see Bernanke et al., 1999; Céspedes et al., 2004). In a small
open-economy where debt is denominated in foreign currency, exchange rate
depreciation can deteriorate the net worth and the balance sheets of rms and
banks. Consequently, this increases the debt service payment and the risk
premium, lowers investment, and contracts output (see Korinek, 2011; Gar-
cía and González, 2013). African countries borrow in foreign denominated
currency and at a premium to nance capital accumulation (see Sy, 2013).
This makes their balance sheets vulnerable to exchange rate depreciation and
foreign interest rate shocks.
One of the measures proposed to mitigate the adverse e¤ects of commod-
ity price shocks in developing countries is the creation of sovereign wealth
funds (SWFs). Given the developing countries limited access to international
capital markets and the incompleteness of commodity-linked hedging mar-
ket, the establishment of SWFs can be a mechanism for reducing developing
countries large exposures to commodity price risk. The SWFs can reduce
scal volatility, smooth consumption, sterilize exchange rate inows, decou-
ple GDP growth from commodity price swings, prevent the resource curse
phenomenon, insure the African economies against commodity price swings,
and mitigate macroeconomic volatility (see, Shabsigh and Ilahi, 2007; Astrov,
2007; Mehrara et al., 2012; Tsani, 2013).
Africa experienced high and continuous economic growth in the past decade.
Growth average 5.3 percent between 2000 and 2010 and doubled the growth
rate between 1990 and 2000 (UNCTAD, 2014). This marked a rapid increase
from 1.8 per cent in the period 19801989. The Africa impressive growth
success has been attributed to both internal and external factors. The inter-
nal factors that contribute to the growth performance include high domestic
demand, better macroeconomic management, and a relatively more stable
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domestic environment. On the external front, rising commodity prices, im-
proved economic cooperation with emerging economies, higher foreign direct
investment (FDI), and increase o¢ cial development assistance contributed
to improved growth performance.
1.2 Motivation for the study
Chapter 2 is motivated by the adverse e¤ects of macroeconomic uctuations
on growth and welfare in African countries. Loayza et al. (2007) ndings
suggest that macroeconomic uctuations lower growth and reduce welfare in
African economies. Existing studies have been inconclusive on the sources
of economic uctuations. While some authors argue that internal shocks are
largely responsible for macroeconomic uctuations (see Sissoko and Diboo¼glu,
2006), other posit that external shocks are signicantly responsible (see Kose
and Riezman, 2001). If external shocks signicantly inuence economic uc-
tuations in African countries, there is need for African countries to reduce
their vulnerability to trade shocks occasioned by the dependence on export
of primary commodity and world nancial shocks induced by foreign interest
rate shocks. Alternatively, if internal shocks are more important, there is the
need for African countries to strenghten their monetary and scal policies.
Chapter 3 is motivated by the puzzle of how relatively small shocks can induce
large real e¤ects in African economies. Negative external shocks seem to have
disproportionate e¤ects on the African economies. Empirical studies have
shown that in a small open economy where external debt is denominated in
foreign currency, the nancial market imperfections amplify external shocks
in the economy (see Elekdag et al., 2006). If the nancial accelerator channel
or balance sheet e¤ect is signicant for African economies, there is need for
African countries to reduce their exposure to foreign currency-denominated
debt. It also has policy implication for the choice of exchange rate regime as
currency depreciation a¤ect the cost of servicing debt.
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Chapter 4 is motivated by the pro-cyclical scal policy in commodity export-
ing African countries and its distortionary e¤ects on the aggregate economy.
The reasons for pro-cyclical scal policy in African countries include their
limited access to international capital market, over-dependence on a sin-
gle and sensitive source of revenue such as transfers from the state-owned
natural resources industries, frequent changes in the discretionary portion of
government expenditure, weak budget institutions, and low political commit-
ment (see, Baldini, 2005; Kumah and Matovu, 2007; Villafuerte and Lopez-
Murphy, 2010; Spatafora and Samake, 2012). Moreover, there is apparent
lack of progress in the management of the boom-bust cycles in commodity
prices. Based on this scal volatility occasioned by commodity price swings,
there is need for African countries to create SWFs that will de-link scal
operations from the vagaries of commodity price uctuations.
1.3 Objectives of the study
(i) To evaluate the relative contributions of internal and external shocks to
macroeconomic uctuations in African economies1;
(ii) To empirically investigate the balance sheet channel in African economies;
and
(iii) To assess the e¤ectiveness of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in ensuring
scal and exchange rate stabilities in commodity exporting African countries.
1.4 Research questions for the study
(i) What are the relative contributions of internal and external shocks to
macroeconomic uctuations in African economies?
(ii) Does the balance sheet channel exist for African economies?
1The ten (10) selected African countries are: Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Morocco,
Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia
4
(iii) Can the establishment of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in commodity
exporting African countries reduce scal and exchange rate volatility?
1.5 Contributions of the study
Chapter 2 of the thesis examines the relative contributions of internal and
external shocks to economic uctuations in African countries. This builds
on the work of Kose and Riezman (2001). The chapter makes both theo-
retical and empirical contributions to the existing literature. First, we ex-
tend the works of Muhanji and Ojah (2011) by incorporating broader exter-
nal shocks and internal shocks that are considered empirically relevant for
African economies. Second, we formulate a monetary DSGE model incorpo-
rating the role of money, ination and external debt dynamics for ten African
economies. Third, we estimate our model with the Bayesian technique for
each of the ten African countries in order to capture the heterogeneity that
may exist among these economies.
In chapter 3, the thesis evaluates the quantitative signicance of the bal-
ance sheet channel in African economies. This contributes to the existing
literature in three respects. First, building on the works of Bernanke et al.
(1999) and Céspedes et al. (2004), we formulate an open economy monetary
DSGE model with nancial market imperfections. Second, we investigate the
quantitative signicance of balance sheet channel in dampening the expan-
sionary e¤ects of exchange rate depreciation in African economies. Third, to
highlight the heterogeneity of each country, we use the Bayesian technique
to estimate our DSGE model for each of the African economies.
In chapter 4, the thesis assesses whether the creation of sovereign wealth
funds (SWFs) can reduce scal volatility and promote macroeconomic sta-
bility in commodity exporting African countries. This chapter contributes
to the existing literature on sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in two respects.
First, we construct a DSGE model incorporating the sovereign wealth funds
5
for commodity exporting African countries. Secondly, we simulate our model
to investigate whether the creation of SWFs can cushion the scal and macro-
economic volatilities in commodity exporting African countries.
1.6 Signicance of the study
Chapter 2 is signicant as the understanding of the sources of macroeconomic
uctuations will assist the policymakers in the formulation of appropriate
macroeconomic policies that could promote macroeconomic stability. It will
assist the policy makers in the formulation of relevant industrial policy such
as the diversication of the economy.
Chapter 3 is signicant for the conduct of monetary policy particularly, the
question of whether monetary policy should react to exchange rate uctua-
tions or not. Should the monetary authority implement tight or loose policy
when the currency depreciates? This chapter is also important for the choice
of exchange rate regime. While Cook (2004) advocates for a xed exchange
rate regime when the balance sheet e¤ect is empirically important, Céspedes
et al. (2004) argue for a exible exchange rate system. In addition, the
chapter is also important for the conduct of scal operation. Findings show
that exposure to foreign currency debt constrains the use of scal policy in-
struments to deal with economic shocks (see, Jeanne and Zettelmeyer, 2002).
A depreciation of the exchange rate weakens the government net worth and
limits its ability to borrow to nance pubic investment.
Chapter 4 is signicant for policy-makers in commodity exporting African
countries. Given the strong positive correlation between commodity revenue
and government expenditure in commodity exporting African countries (see
Baunsgaard, 2003), the chapter provides measures for the de-coupling of scal
operation from the volatile commodity revenue. Similarly, the chapter pro-
vides mechanism for mitigating the e¤ect of export receipt inow on money
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supply on the domestic economy. Raju and melo (2003) show that co¤ee
price shocks signicantly a¤ect money supply in Columbia. Lastly, the chap-
ter will assist the policy-makers in the e¢ cient management of commodity
revenue.
1.7 Organisation of the study
The rest of the study is organised as follows. Chapter 2 examines the sources
of macroeconomic uctuations in African economies. Chapter 3 investigates
the quantitative signicance of balance sheet channel in African economies.
Chapter 4 evaluates the e¤ectiveness of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in
mitigating the macroeconomic volatility in African commodity exporting
countries. Finally, chapter 5 concludes the study with policy implications
and recommendations.
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CHAPTER TWO
Macroeconomic Shocks and Fluctuations in African Economies
Abstract
We formulate a monetary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model to examine the relative contributions of internal and external shocks to
economic uctuations in ten African countries. The model is estimated with
the Bayesian technique using twelve macroeconomic variables. Generally, the
ndings indicate that both the internal and external shocks signicantly in-
uence output uctuations in African countries. Over a four quarter horizon,
internal shocks are dominant while over eight to sixteen quarter horizons, the
external shocks are dominant. Among the external shocks, external debt, ex-
change rate, foreign interest rate and commodity price shocks account for a
large part of output variations in African economies. Money supply and
productivity shocks are the most important internal shocks contributing to
output uctuations in African countries.
2.1. Introduction
This paper quanties the role of di¤erent shocks in driving macroeconomic
uctuations in African economies. Large and recurrent economic uctua-
tions in developing countries have been a major concern for economists and
policymakers. Findings, however, on the most important shocks inuencing
economic uctuations in developing countries have been rather inconclusive.
A strand of literature attributes the recurrent economic uctuations in de-
veloping countries to external shocks (Mendoza, 1995; Kose, 2002; Hammed,
2003). In contrast, other studies conclude that internal shocks are largely
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responsible for output uctuations in developing countries (Ho¤maister et
al., 2001; Raddatz, 2007).
The signicance of understanding the sources of macroeconomic uctuations
is that policymakers can formulate appropriate policies to mitigate the e¤ects
of adverse shocks on their economies. For example, Guillamont et al.(1999)
nd that macroeconomic uctuations lower economic growth and reduce wel-
fare in African economies. However, as in other studies that focus on the
role of di¤erent shocks, studies on African economies yield conicting re-
sults. Kose and Riezman (2001) nd that external shocks exert a dominant
inuence on output uctuations in Africa. On the other hand, Ho¤maister et
al. (1997) and Sissoko and Diboo¼glu (2006) nd that internal shocks largely
explain output variations in Africa. Therefore understanding the relative
importance of these shocks is crucial for sound macroeconomic management.
The gap that this paper seeks to ll is that existing studies do not use a
monetary DSGE model estimated for each of the African economies. Fur-
thermore, the existing studies investigate relatively few shocks in their mod-
els. For example, Kose and Riezman (2001) calibrate a non-monetary DSGE
model for a typical African economy. They consider the relative importance
of terms-of-trade and foreign interest rate shocks in driving macroeconomic
uctuations. Muhanji and Ojah (2011) estimate a monetary DSGE model
for several African economies. They, however, only focus on the impact of
commodity price and world interest rate shocks on external debt accumu-
lation. Cashin et al.(2004) focus on the impact of commodity price shocks
on the real exchange rate of commodity exporting countries. Ho¤maister et
al.(1997) and Sissoko and Diboo¼glu (2006) use VAR to examine the relative
contributions of internal and external shocks to macroeconomic uctuations
in sub-Saharan African countries.
The contribution of this paper is to formulate and estimate a monetary DSGE
model for ten African economies. The ten African countries are selected based
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on the availability of consistent quarterly time series data. We build on the
works of Kose and Riezman (2001) and Muhanji and Ojah (2011) by incorpo-
rating the role of money, ination and external debt dynamics in the DSGE
model and considering a broader set of shocks. Our model incorporates
eleven structural shocks that are considered empirically relevant for African
economies. Moreover, we estimate our model with the Bayesian technique
for each of the ten African countries in order to capture the heterogeneity
that may exist among these economies.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 reviews existing literature on
di¤erent shocks and their impact on macroeconomic uctuations, section
3 presents stylised facts for Africa in the spirit of Agénor et al.(1999), in
section 4 we formulate our DSGE model, section 5 provides data description
and estimates the models parameters and section 6 concludes with some
policy recommendations.
2.2. Review of literature
There is inconclusive evidence on the sources of economic uctuations in de-
veloping countries. For example, Basu and McLeod (1992), Mendoza (1995),
and Agénor et al. (1999) nd that terms of trade shocks signicantly af-
fect output uctuations in developing countries. Using a calibrated DSGE
model, Kose and Riezman (2001) nd that trade shocks signicantly in-
uence macroeconomic uctuations in Africa during the period 1970-1990.
Similarly, Bleaney and Greenaway (2001) employ the xed e¤ects panel re-
gression to examine the impact of terms of trade shocks in 14 Sub-Saharan
African (SSA) countries over 1980-1995. The evidence suggests that trade
shocks negatively a¤ect growth in SSA countries. In contrast, Ho¤maister
and Roldós (2001), and Raddatz (2007) nd that terms of trade shocks have
little impact in developing countries. Ho¤maister et al. (1998) and Sissoko
and Diboo¼glu (2006), using VAR technique, nd that internal and not exter-
nal shocks inuence output variations in African countries. Jidoud (2012),
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using a DSGEmodel, nds that productivity shocks are the dominant sources
of output volatility in Côte dIvoire.
A number of authors have examined the contribution of commodity price
shocks to output and ination dynamics in commodity exporting develop-
ing countries. Edwards (1984) nds that a higher price of co¤ee generates a
higher growth of money and a higher rate of ination in Colombia. Raju and
Melo (2003) nd that positive co¤ee price shocks increase real output and
ination in Colombia through the revenue and spending e¤ects. Similarly,
Mehrara and Oskoui (2007) nd that oil price shocks a¤ect output uctua-
tions in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iwayemi and Fowowe (2011), however, nd
that oil price shocks do not have signicant e¤ect on output and ination in
Nigeria.
Similarly, studies have examined the link between commodity prices, ex-
change rate and external debt in commodity exporting countries. For ex-
ample, Cashin et al. (2004) show that commodity prices inuence the real
exchange rate in commodity exporting countries through change in wages in
the commodity sector. Frankel (2007) nds that mineral prices a¤ect real
exchange rate movements in South Africa. Koranchelian (2005) nds a pos-
itive relation between oil price and exchange rate in Algeria. Bodart et al.
(2012) and Dauvin (2014) conclude that commodity price shocks drive the
real exchange rate movements in commodity exporting countries. In relation
to external debt, Muhanji and Ojah (2011) nd that positive commodity
price shocks lead to external debt accumulation in African countries. This is
attributed to increased expenditure and over-borrowing during commodity
price boom.
Relatedly, studies have also investigated the vulnerability of developing coun-
tries to exchange rate and external debt shocks. For example, Carranza et
al. (2003) nd that exchange rate volatility negatively a¤ect investment in
emerging economies. This is attributed to the balance sheet e¤ects of liability
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dollarization. Kamin and Rodgers (2000) nd that exchange rate deprecia-
tion leads to high ination and economic contraction in Mexico. In contrast,
Bastos and Divino (2009) nd that exchange rate volatility has limited im-
pact on output uctuations in Mauritius. Hsing (2003) nds that external
debt shocks negatively a¤ect output in Brazil.
International shocks such as foreign interest rate, US output and monetary
policy shocks have been found to a¤ect economic activities in emerging and
developing economies. Uribe and Yue (2006) nd that foreign interest rate
shocks a¤ect output uctuations in emerging economies through a change in
the countrys spread. Similarly, Canova (2005) nds that US monetary policy
shocks signicantly a¤ect Latin American economies through its inuence on
their domestic interest rate and capital ow. The study, however, shows that
US output shocks have insignicant e¤ects on output in Latin American
countries. Ma´ckowiak (2007) nds that US monetary policy shocks inuence
the price level and output in emerging market economies through its e¤ects
on the exchange rate. Sosa (2008) also underlines that US output shocks are
the main factors driving economic uctuations in Mexico.
Many authors have attempted to quantify the e¤ects of domestic interest
rate and monetary policy shocks on the real economy. Reinhart and Rein-
hart (1991) nd that monetary policy shocks inuence output uctuations
in Columbia. Using DSGE model for Brazil, Kanczuk (2004) ndings indi-
cate that output uctuations in Brazil are quite responsive to real interest
rate shocks. Mallick and Sousa (2012) provide evidence that contractionary
monetary policy has strong negative e¤ects on output in emerging economies.
2.3. The stylised facts
Except in Malawi and Tunisia, the selected African countries maintain a
exible exchange rate regime. Morocco maintains a tightly managed oat
against a basket of currencies. Table 1 presents the correlations for macro-
economic shocks and output in African countries. The correlations between
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foreign input price shocks and output are positive in nine African countries.
This possibly reects the importance of the trade channel in those countries.
Positive foreign input price shocks worsen the terms of trade, improve the
trade balance, and expand output. The output expansion cuts across both
xed and exible exchange rate regimes. This suggests that the exchange
rate regime does not matter in output variability for African countries. This
is consistent with the ndings by Flood and Rose (1995) and Ghosh et al.
(1997). But for Malawi, the correlation is negative, indicating that output
declines following positive foreign input price shocks.
The correlations for nominal exchange rate and output are quite mixed. In
eight African countries, there are positive correlations between the nominal
exchange rate and output, suggesting that depreciation is expansionary. This
implies that exchange rate depreciation decreases imports, increases export
and expands output. This is consistent with the ndings by Kandil and
Mirzaie (2005) for developing countries. But for Malawi and Morocco, the
correlations are negative, indicating a contractionary depreciation. This may
be attributed to the balance sheet e¤ect where an exchange rate depreciation
deteriorates the countriesnet worth, increases debt service payments and
reduces output (see, e.g., Berganza et al., 2004). Alternatively, it may be
the supply shock channel where a depreciation increases the cost of imported
intermediate inputs and lowers output.
Similarly, the correlations between real exchange rate and output are also
heterogeneous across African economies. The correlations are positive for
Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia, and Uganda. This implies that real
exchange rate depreciation is expansionary. This is similar to the ndings by
Kandil and Mirzaie (2005). In contrast, the correlation results are negative
for Egypt, Kenya, Malawi, Morocco, and Zambia, indicating contractionary
exchange rate depreciation. This is in line with the conclusion by Ahmed
(2003), in the context of Latin America.
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Moreover, the correlations between commodity prices and output are posi-
tive in eight African countries, indicating that natural resource abundance
promotes growth in these countries. A rise in commodity prices increases
revenues, capital expenditure, and gross capital formation in these countries.
This gross capital formation increases investment and output. This is in line
with the ndings by Collier (2007) for commodity African countries. But
for Kenya and Uganda, the correlations are negative, suggesting that nat-
ural resource abundance lowers growth in the two countries. This may be
evidence of Dutch disease syndrome whereby commodity price booms lead
to real exchange rate appreciation and export uncompetitiveness (see, e.g.,
Sachs and Warner, 2001).
In line with a priori expectation, the correlation results are generally negative
between interest rates and output for all the countries. This indicates that a
tight monetary policy increases the cost of capital, reduces investment and
output. This is consistent with the results by Kanczuk (2004) for Brazil.
Likewise, there are negative correlations between foreign interest rate and
output for nine African countries. In view of the level of external debt of
African countries, positive foreign interest rate shocks can increase the cost
of borrowing and debt service payments, reduce domestic investment and
output. This is in line with the ndings by Uribe and Yue (2006) for emerging
economies. But for Malawi, the correlation result is positive. This is quite
counterintuitive.
In addition, there are positive correlations between foreign output and domes-
tic output in nine countries. This reects the trade channel and international
transmission of business cycles where a rise in foreign output increases de-
mand for African commodity exports. The rising demand for African exports
increases export revenue, capital expenditure, and output. This is similar to
the ndings of Berument and Kilinc (2004) for Turkey. However, the corre-
lation result is negative for Malawi. This is counter-intuitive.
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Lastly, there is a high negative correlation between external debt to GDP and
output in eight African countries. This may be attributed to the debt over-
hang hypothesis where high debt acts as a tax on future output and reduces
the incentive for savings and investment. Alternatively, it may be explained
by liquidity constraint, where the requirement to service debt reduces funds
for investment purposes and hence reduces output. This is line with the nd-
ings by Fosu (1999) for Sub-Saharan African and Sen et al. (2007) for Latin
America. In Malawi and South Africa, on the other hand, there is a positive
correlation between external debt to GDP and output.
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Table 2.1: Correlation between economic shocks and output
yt;pit yt;st yt;rert yt;qt yt;rt yt;rft
yt;yft
yt;dt
Egypt 0:98
(36:05)
0:82
(10:3)
 0:34
( 2:6)
0:98
(35:74)
 0:84
( 11:45)
 0:56
( 5:02)
0:92
(17:57)
 0:85
( 11:59)
Ghana 0:98
(47:4)
0:94
(24:55)
0:64
(8:33)
0:63
(7:52)
 0:72
( 9:69)
 0:69
(8:79)
0:95
(28:46)
 0:55
( 6:07)
Kenya 0:99
(60:5)
0:74
(10:06)
 0:95
( 30:02)
 0:12
( 1:09)
 0:67
( 8:55)
 0:67
( 8:27)
0:93
(23:49)
 0:82
( 13:23)
Malawi  0:90
( 17:27)
 0:99
( 67:03)
 1:00
( 95:14)
0:96
(28:19)
 0:47
( 4:52)
0:50
(4:87)
 0:99
(76:82)
0:04
(0:36)
Morocco 0:98
(40:12)
 0:69
( 7:94)
 0:40
( 3:67)
0:84
(13:14)
 0:77
( 9:99)
 0:69
( 7:95)
0:94
(22:76)
 0:92
( 19:82)
Nigeria 0:84
(13:12)
0:76
(10:09)
0:60
(6:49)
0:94
(24:6)
 0:37
( 3:41)
 0:43
( 4:11)
0:78
(10:59)
 0:85
( 14:0)
S. Africa 0:97
(33:39)
0:77
(10:01)
0:18
(1:53)
0:74
(9:11)
 0:77
( 10:09)
 0:68
( 7:69)
0:96
(28:53)
0:81
(11:36)
Tunisia 0:34
(3:06)
0:80
(11:55)
0:80
(11:55)
0:29
(2:63)
 0:75
( 9:8)
 0:15
( 1:29)
0:72
(8:92)
 0:06
( 0:52)
Uganda 0:97
(33:4)
0:95
(25:93)
0:47
(4:59)
 0:25
( 2:17)
 0:18
( 1:55)
 0:64
( 7:06)
0:96
(30:0)
 0:86
( 14:6)
Zambia 0:91
(16:17)
0:80
(10:06)
 0:91
( 16:04)
0:89
(14:99)
 0:84
( 11:7)
 0:48
( 4:13)
0:96
(24:14)
 0:94
( 21:57)
 is the correlation coe¢ cient, yt is output proxied by the GDP or industrial
output ; pit is foreign input price proxied by US producer price index for
manufactured goods , st is nominal exchange rate dened as domestic
currency units per one dollar, rert is real exchange rate, qt is commodity
prices, rt is domestic interest rate, r
f
t is foreign interest rate proxied by
LIBOR, yft is foreign output proxied by US GDP, and d

t is external debt to
GDP. The t-statistics is in parenthesis.
2.4. The model
2.4.1 Households
We employ a DSGE model with non-separable money similar to the one in
Andrés et al. (2006) and Castelnuovo (2012). Given the importance of foreign
currency holdings by African households as noted by Elkhaf (2002) and
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Adom et al. (2008), we assume that households allocate their real holdings
between domestic and foreign currencies. For simplicity, we assume this
allocation to be in xed proportions, so that StMt = %Mt, where St is the
nominal exchange rate, Mt is foreign nominal money and Mt is domestic
nominal money. The householdspreferences are given by:
Ut =
1X
t=0
t
1
1  
"
Ct
Cht 1
1  
1 +
%
St

Mt
Pt
#
  N
1+ 
t
1 +  
(1)
where Ct, Pt and Nt represent aggregate consumption, domestic price level
and labour respectively. The parameter hmeasures the degree of habit forma-
tion in consumption. The parameter  is the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient
;   (0; 1) is the discount factor;  is the inverse of the Frisch labour supply
elasticity and  represents interest rate elasticity of money demand.
Households hold their wealth in the form of foreign and domestic currency
and domestic bonds. Furthermore, households borrow from foreign capital
markets. Therefore, the budget constraint is:
Ct +

1 +
%
St

Mt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
  StD

t
Pt
=
WtNt
Pt
+
Bt 1
Pt
(1 + rt 1)
+

1 +
%
St

Mt 1
Pt
(2)
 StD

t 1
Pt
 
1 + rdt 1

where Dt is the level of foreign debt, Wt is the nominal wage rate, rt is the
domestic nominal interest rate and rdt is the interest rate on foreign debt.
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Households enter period t with domestic money holdings Mt, bonds Bt, and
foreign debt Dt :
Households choose the path of Ct;Mt; Bt; and Nt that maximize expected
utility. The rst order conditions are:
1
Cht 1

Ct
Cht 1
  
1 +
%
St

Mt
Pt

= t (3)

1  

Ct
Cht 1
1  
1 +
%
St

Mt
Pt
 1
1
Pt
=
t
Pt

1 +
%
St

  t+1
Pt+1

1 +
%
St

(4)
Wt
Pt
=
N t
t
(5)
t+1 (1 + rt)
Pt
Pt+1
= t (6)
t+1
St+1
Pt+1
 
1 + rdt 1

= t
St+1
Pt
(7)
where equations (3)(7) denote the derivatives of the utility function to its
arguments.
To derive our consumption equation, we equate Eq. (3) to Eq. (6) as:
1
Cht 1

Ct
Cht 1
  
1 +
%
St

Mt
Pt

= t+1 (1 + rt)
Pt
Pt+1
This is linearized to derive our consumption Euler equation:
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ect = h (   1)
c
ect 1 + 
c
Etect+1 + 
c
emt   
c
Et emt+1
  %
s0c
est + %
s0c
Etest+1   1
c
(ert   Etet+1) (8)
whereedenotes percentage deviation from the steady state and c =  +
h (   1). As in Castelnuovo (2012), Eq.(8) shows that consumption de-
pends on the weighted average of past and expected future consumption,
real interest rate, and real balances. Furthermore, to the extent that house-
holds hold domestic currency, a depreciation of the current exchange rate
reduces household wealth, which reduces aggregate consumption. Through
this channel, the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate may generate
a contractionary e¤ect on output as pointed out by Krugman and Taylor
(1978) and Edwards (1986).
In order to express the IS curve in terms of output, we rst write the macro-
balance (market equilibrium) equation as:
eyt = cect + xext   zezt + "g;t (9)
where eyt is the percentage deviation of output from the steady state, ext
percentage deviation of export from the steady state and ezt is the percentage
deviation of import from the steady state. The parameter j is the steady
state ratio of variable j to output, "g;t is a demand shock that combines
government expenditure and investment shocks. We follow McCallum and
Nelson (2000) in formulating our net export function as:
fnxt = yfeyft   yeyt + rfrert (10)
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where eyft , yf , y, and r, are the foreign output, elasticity of net export to
foreign output, the elasticity of net export to domestic output, and sum of
elasticity of substitution in production for home and abroad respectively .
The real exchange rate is dened as frert  est+ ept   ept: Substituting Eq.(10)
into Eq.(9) yields the expression:
ect = 1
c
 
1 + y
 eyt   r
c
frert   yf
c
eyft (11)
Substituting Eq.(11) into Eq.(9) yields the output-based IS equation:
eyt = h (   1)
c
eyt 1 + 
c
Eteyt+1   c
c
 
1 + y
 (ert   Etet+1)
+
c
c
 
1 + y
 emt   c
c
 
1 + y
Et emt+1   %c
s0c
 
1 + y
est
+
%c
s0c
 
1 + y
Etest+1   h (   1) r
c
 
1 + y
 frert 1
+
r 
1 + y
 frert   r
c
 
1 + y
Etfrert+1   h (   1) yf
c
 
1 + y
 eyft 1 (12)
+
yf 
1 + y
eyft   yf
c
 
1 + y
Eteyft+1 + "at
We assume that the innovation "yt follows a rst-order autoregressive process
as "at = a"
a
t 1 + 
a
t . Output depends positively on the real exchange rate
and foreign output. As a departure from McCallum and Nelson (2000), our
dynamic IS equation also features output as a function of lags and leads of
the real exchange rate and foreign output.
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2.4.2 Firms
In line with Batini et al. (2005) and Malikane (2014), we assume that nal
goods producing rms exhibit non-linear input requirement in the production
function such that Xi;t = Y
i
t where Xi;t is the amount of non-labour input
i required in production, Yt is output, and i > 0 is the elasticity of the
input requirement with respect to changes in output. Labour and non-labour
inputs are complements as in Smets and Wouters (2002). The production
function is given as:
Yt = AtN

t
"
nY
i=1
Y iit
#
(13)
where At denotes productivity shocks, Nt is the level of employment, i is the
elasticity of output with respect to input i, i > 0 is the input requirement
coe¢ cient, and 0 <  < 1 . The reduced form of Eq.(13) is:
Yt = A
0
tN

t (14)
where  =
nX
i=1
ii;  =

1  , and A
0
t =a
1
1  . The productivity shock is
assumed to follow a rst order autoregressive process: At = pAAt 1 + "
p
t
Using Eq.(14), total real cost is:
TCt =
WtY
1

t
A
0
1

t Pt
+
nX
i=1
Pit
Pt
Y it (15)
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where Pit is the price of foreign intermediate input i , Pt is the aggregate
price level while Wt denotes the nominal wages. Let pit be the real price of
non-labour input, the real marginal cost can be specied as:
MCt =
WtY
1 

t
A
0 1

t Pt
+
nX
i=1
ipitY
i 1
t (16)
where MCt represents the marginal cost.
We follow Galí and Gertler (1999) and formulate the hybrid new Keynesian
Phillips curve as follows:
et = fEtet+1 + bet 1 + fmct (17)
where:
f  f + ! [1   (1  )]g 1;  (1  ) (1  ) (1  !) 
b  !f + ! [1   (1  )]g 1;  
(1  )
1 +  ("  1)f + ! [1   (1  )]g
 1;
 measures price stickiness, ! is the degree of price indexation, " is the goods
elasticity of substitution. We linearize Eq. (16) and substitute Eq. (5) and
Eq.(11) to derive the marginal cost written as:
fmct = #aeyt   #beyt 1   #c emt + #dest   #efrert
+#f frert 1   #geyft + #heyft 1 + #iepit   #jeat (18)
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where:
#a =
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2.4.3 Exchange rate and external debt
The interest rate on foreign debt is made up of the foreign risk-free rate and
the risk premium. We assume that rdt = r
f
t   !qeqt + !d edt . This implies that
the sovereign risk premium is driven positively by the burden of external debt,
which increases the risk of default and negatively by commodity prices, which
increase the dollar liquidity of the commodity-exporting country. In our
formulation, a positive shock to the foreign risk-free interest rate increases the
countrys interest rate spread and the cost of borrowing (see Uribe and Yue,
2006). In contrast, positive shocks to commodity prices reduce the spread
and cost of borrowing for commodity exporting countries (see Senhadji, 2003;
Muhanji and Ojah, 2011).
We combine Eqs.(6) and (7):
t+1
St+1
Pt+1
 
1 + rdt 1

= t+1 (1 + rt)
Pt
Pt+1
St+1
Pt
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This is linearized to derive the UIP expression as follows:
est = Etest+1   (ert   erft )  !qeqt + !d edt + "dt (19)
where est is the nominal exchange rate, (ert erft ) is the risk premium, eqt is the
commodity price and edt is external debt to GDP ratio. The coe¢ cients !q
and !d represent the sensitivity of the sovereign risk premium with respect
to the commodity price and external debt respectively. As noted by García
and González (2013), a higher risk premium induces capital outow and de-
preciates the exchange rate. Moreover, the exchange rate depends negatively
on commodity prices and positively on external debt to GDP ratio, as shown
by Cashin et al.(2004).
The dynamics of external debt depends on the current account balance and
foreign debt service payment. Thus, the external debt to GDP ratio evolves
according to the following equation:
Dt
PtYt
=
Zt  Xt
Yt
+
 
1 + rdt 1

dt 1 (20)
where D

t
PtYt
is the ratio of external debt to GDP, Zt Xt
Yt
represents the current
account balance by the private sector and rdt is the interest rate on external
debt. The change in the debt ratio over time can then be written as:
dt = (zt   xt) + dt 1
 
1 + rdt 1   t 1  yt 1

(21)
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Eq.(21) shows that the change in the external debt ratio is a positive function
of net import and foreign interest rate. For example, a rise in net imports
is nanced by borrowing, thereby increasing the level of debt. Similarly, an
increase in interest rate on external debt increases the debt service payment
and therefore puts upward pressure on the debt ratio. We linearize Eq.(21)
and substitute Eq.(10) to derive the equation for the dynamics of the external
debt ratio. Note that from Eq.(19) we have rdt = r
f
t   !qeqt + !d edt and we
substitute (zt   xt) = fnxt = yfeyft   yeyt + rfrert. Using this fact, we have
the debt equation as follows:
edt = a edt 1 + berft   ceyt   deyt   eeqt   f frert   geyft + "et (22)
where
d = (1 + g0)
2   r0!d; a =
(1 + g0) + r0
d
; b =
r0
d
;
c =
(1 + g0) y
dd

0
; d =
r0 + (1 + g0)
3
(1 + g0)
; e =
r0!q
d
;
f =
(1 + g0) r
dd

0
; g =
(1 + g0) yf
dd

0
; "et = e"
e
t 1 + 
e
t
Eq. (22) describes the external debt evolution where g0 is the steady state
growth rate, r0 is the steady state interest rate, and d0 is steady state debt-
GDP ratio. Positive commodity price shocks generate additional revenue
which can used to reduce the level of external debt (see Arezki and Brückner,
2012). Thus, Eq. (22) shows a negative relation between external debt and
commodity prices. In addition, external debt to GDP depends negatively on
domestic output and positively on foreign output. Positive domestic output
growth reduces external borrowing and hence decreases the level of external
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debt. Lastly, external debt to GDP depends positively on foreign interest
rate and real exchange rate.
2.4.4 Monetary policy
To derive the money market equation, we equate(4) and (6). This is written
as:
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
Ct
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1  
1 +
%
St

Mt
Pt
 1
1
Pt
=
t
Pt

1 +
%
St

(23)
  t
Pt (1 + rt)

1 +
%
St

We linearize Eq.(23) and substitute ect = 1c eyt   xc ext + zc ezt and ext   ezt =
rfrert   y eyt + yfeyft . This yields the money market equation written as:
ert = aeyt   b emt + cest   %Etest+1   dfrert   eeyft + "bt (24)
where
"rt = b"
r
t 1 + 
b
t ; a =
r
 
1 + y
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mc
; b =
r
m
; c =
%
s0
r;
d =
rr
mc
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m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Eq.(24) describes the money market equation. The interest rate depends pos-
itively on real output and negatively on real balances. The interest rate also
depends positively on current exchange rate and negatively on expected fu-
ture exchange rate. Lastly, interest rate depends negatively on real exchange
rate and foreign output.
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Given monetary aggregate targeting in Africa, we follow Muhanji and Ojah
(2011) in the specication of our monetary policy reaction function. Money
supply is driven by ination gap, output gap, and commodity price gap. We
include the real exchange rate in the monetary aggregate Taylor-type rule.
The monetary aggregate Taylor-type rule is:
emt = m emt 1   (1  m)[et 1 + yeyt 1 + rerfrert 1 + qeqt 1]
+"mt (25)
where all variables are in percentage deviations from the steady states. emt
is monetary aggregate, et is ination rate gap, eyt is output gap, frert is real
exchange rate gap, eqt is commodity price gap. The disturbance follows an
AR(1) process: "mt = c"
m
t 1+
c
t . The parameter m is policy rate smoothing,
 is policy reaction to ination gap, y is policy reaction to output gap, rer
is policy reaction to real exchange rate gap, and q is policy reaction to
commodity price gap. The structural shock processes in the model are given
by the following vector:
et =  et + ";t; ";t  N  0; 2 (26)
where
";t =
heqt; erft ; eyft ; epit; et; frerti
The equations to be estimated are summarized below:
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2.5. Data and estimation
2.5.1. Data sources and treatment
Data for the study were obtained from the International Financial statistics
(IFS), the World Bank, and Central Bank database of the selected African
countries. We estimate the model using quarterly time series data on twelve
macroeconomic variables in ten African countries for the period 1990:1
2011:4. Due to data availability, the sample size di¤ers from one country
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to the other. For Egypt, 1998:2 2011:4; Ghana, 1990:1 2011:4; Kenya,
1990:1 2011: 4; Malawi, 1990:1 2007:4; Morocco, 1995:4 2011:4; Nigeria,
1990:1 2008:4; South Africa, 1994:1 2011:4; Tunisia, 1994:1 2011: 4;
Uganda, 1993:2 2011:4 ; and Zambia, 1997: 1 2011:3.
The twelve macroeconomic variables are: ination, nominal interest rate, real
GDP (industrial output), real money balances, external debt to GDP, real
commodity price, nominal exchange rate, real exchange rate, foreign interest
rate, real foreign output, foreign ination and foreign inputs price. The
foreign interest rate is proxied by LIBOR, foreign output by US GDP, foreign
ination by US CPI, and price of foreign inputs by US PPI for manufactured
goods. Real commodity price is derived by deating the nominal commodity
price with the US CPI. Due to the non-availability of reliable quarterly GDP
data for Malawi, Nigeria, and Tunisia, we use industrial output to proxy
GDP for the three countries.
2.5.2. Prior distribution and calibration of the parameters
In line with the Bayesian estimation literature (see e.g., Smets and Wouters,
2003), we estimate the model by forming priors distributions and minimizing
the posterior distributions of the model parameters (see appendix 2.3 for prior
and posterior graphs). As in Smets and Wouters (2007), the persistence of
the AR(1) processes follow a beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard
error 0.2. The standard error of the shocks are inverse-gamma distribution
with a mean 0.1 and two degrees of freedom. We use the same prior values for
all countries in our sample as in García and González (2013). This allows the
data to reveal the degree of t of these values to the realities of the countries.
The Metropolis-Hastings (M-H) draws, however, for the convergence of the
Markov chain di¤er among countries2.
2The M-H algorithm draws are: Egypt (10,000), Ghana, (10,000), Kenya, (50,000),
Malawi, (10,000), Morocco, (5,000), Nigeria, (50,000), South Africa, (10,000), Tunisia,
(20,000), Uganda, (10,000), and Zambia, (20,000)
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Similar to Castelnuovo (2012), we assume the habit parameter h to be a
beta distribution with a mean 0.7 and standard deviation 0.1. The price
stickiness parameter  and price indexation parameter ! are assumed to be
beta distributed with mean 0.65 and 0.5 and standard errors 0.1 and 0.15
respectively. The calibration of , , and  , comes from Smets and Wouters
(2007). In line with Benchimol and Fourçans (2012), the inverse elasticity
of money holding is assumed to be a normal distribution with mean 1.25
and standard error 0.05. As in Elkhaf (2002), the parameter for currency
substitution is a beta distribution with mean 0.3 and standard deviation of
0.14.
The monetary policy reaction function parameters follow the money-based
Taylor rule. Following Smets and Wouters (2007), the long run reaction
coe¢ cient to output and ination are assumed to be a normal distribution
with mean 0.12 and 1.5 and standard error 0.05 and 0.25 respectively. The
monetary smoothing parameter is assumed to be a beta distribution with a
mean 0.75 and standard error 0.1. Similar to García and González (2013),
the policy reaction parameters to real exchange rate is assumed to be a beta
mean 0.5 and standard error 0.1. We assume the same value for reaction to
commodity price shocks.
Similar to Steinbach et al. (2009), the calibration for  is 0.99 and in line with
Castelnuovo (2012), the calibration for " is 6. The parameter r is calibrated
to be 0.66 as in McCallum and Nelson (2000). Following Lombardo and
McAdam (2012), our calibration for y is 0.2, yf is 0.2, ls is 0.5, and for c
is 0.58. In line with Batini et al. (2005), we assume that input requirements
per unit of output is increasing at the margin because rms tend to use less
e¢ cient machines as output rises, we therefore set i = 2. We assume that the
steady state share of intermediate input costs in total output pi0x0y 10 = 0:5.
This is a reasonable calibration for African economies, given the evidence by
Eifert et al.(2008).
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2.5.3 Posterior estimates of the structural parameters
Table 2A and 2B present the prior mean and posterior estimates of the model
behavioural parameters. We estimate the posterior distribution by using
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm3. Starting from the estimates of behavioural
parameters, the habit formation parameter h is estimated to be more than
70 percent of past consumption in Egypt, Kenya, Malawi, and Tunisia. This
is similar to the estimates reported in Smets and Wouters (2007). In Ghana,
Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia habit formation is around 60
percent of past consumption while it represents less than 50 percent of past
consumption in Morocco. The interest rate elasticity of money  estimates
revolve around 1.1 to 1.3 for all the countries. This is close to the estimates
by Benchimol and Fourçans (2012). Estimates for foreign currency holding,
%, range from 0.27 to 0.32. This is similar to the ndings by Elkhaf (2002).
Turning to the degree of Calvo pricing, the mean estimate of the degree of
price stickiness  ranges from 0.49 in Ghana to 0.73 in Kenya. This indi-
cates that price is re-optimized within the average of 2-3 quarters in African
economies. This is similar to the estimates by Steinbach et al. (2009) for
South Africa. On average, the degree of price indexation ! seems to be gen-
erally lower than 0.5 in African countries, implying that less than half of price
setters are backward looking. This is in line with the estimates by Smets and
Wouters (2007). Except in Egypt and Morocco, forward-looking behaviour
f dominates ination dynamics in African economies. This reects in higher
implied estimate of f compare to b in African countries.
In line with the Taylor rule, the parameter estimates for ination  indicate
strong long run reaction of monetary policy to ination in African countries.
The mean estimates range from 1.24 in Kenya to 1.85 in South Africa. This
is higher than the estimates by Steinbach et al. (2009) for South Africa. We
3For the Bayesian estimation and algorithm, we employed Dynare developed by
Michel Juillards and others.
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also nd a substantial degree of policy smoothing mag, ranging from 0.63 in
Egypt to 0.98 in Morocco. Policy response to output gap in Africa ranges
from moderate in Nigeria to strong in South Africa. Moreover, the estimates
indicate a strong response of policy to commodity price shocks q in few
African countries. Lastly, we nd that policy responds both moderately and
strongly to real exchange rate gap rer in African countries.
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2.5.4 Posterior estimates of the structural shocks
The estimated processes for the exogenous disturbances are shown in Table
3A and 3B. The estimated processes reveal some similarities for many African
countries. For example, in Egypt the most persistent shocks are foreign input
price with mean 1.00, external debt and exchange rate with mean 0.98 each,
productivity with mean 0.96, and money supply with mean 0.79. Similarly,
in Ghana, the most persistent shocks are foreign interest rate with mean
1.00, external debt with mean 0.96, real exchange rate with mean 0.82, and
foreign input price with mean 0.65, and productivity with mean 0.64. In
Kenya, the most persistent shocks are external debt and nominal exchange
rate with mean 0.93 each, commodity price with mean 0.92, foreign output
with mean 0.91, and nominal exchange rate with mean 0.85.
In Malawi, the most important shocks are foreign input price with mean 1.00,
productivity with mean 0.98, external debt with mean 0.93, real exchange
rate with mean 0.74 and foreign interest rate with mean 0.66. The most
persistent shocks in Morocco are nominal exchange rate with mean 1.00,
external debt with mean 0.99, foreign interest rate and domestic interest rate
with mean 0.96 each, and money supply with mean 0.91. Foreign input price,
productivity, external debt, interest rate, and foreign interest rate shocks are
estimated to be the most persistent in Nigeria with mean of 1.00, 0.94, 0.93,
0.88 and 0.69 respectively. In South Africa, the most persistent shocks are
external debt with mean 0.95, foreign input price and commodity price with
mean 0.89 each, nominal exchange rate with mean 0.86, and foreign interest
rate with mean 0.84.
Estimates for Tunisia indicate that external debt, foreign interest rate, foreign
ination, productivity, and interest rate shocks are the most persistent with
mean coe¢ cient of 1.00, 0.78, 0.71, 0.69, and 0.62 respectively. In Uganda,
interest rate, productivity, external debt, foreign interest rate, and foreign
input price shocks are the most persistent with mean 0.98, 0.97, 0.89, 0.88 and
35
0.86 respectively. Lastly, results for Zambia suggest that foreign input price,
external debt, productivity, real exchange rate, and interest rate shocks are
the most persistent with mean 1.00, 0.97, 0.96, 0.91, and 0.73 respectively.
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2.5 Sub-sample estimates
To examine whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion of global crisis
period, (2008-2010), we estimate the sample up till 2007 i.e before the be-
ginning of the global crises. Table 3C shows the estimates of the structural
shocks up till 2007. There is no signicant di¤erence between the sub-sample
estimates and the whole sample estimates. The sub-sample results indicate
that external shocks still remain persistent. A notable feature is the per-
sistence of external debt shocks across the countries. This is followed by
productivity shocks, foreign input price shocks, commodity price shocks, do-
mestic interest rate shocks, foreign interest rate shocks, and exchange rate
shocks.
The persistence of external shocks for the sub-sample and the whole sample
estimates suggests that African economies are vulnerable to trade and world
nancial shocks. This could be attributed to their dependence on the ex-
ports of narrow range of primary commodities whose prices are very volatile.
Commodity price volatility generate erratic export revenue and instability
in foreign exchange and scal operations. The volatility in scal operations
trigger external debt problem. African countries borrow externally to smooth
consumption during negative commodity price shocks.
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2.6 Impulse response functions
Fig. 1-11 in appendix 2.1 are impulse response functions (IRFs) showing the
dynamic response of output to both internal and external shocks in African
countries. Starting from Fig. 1, an increase in interest rate causes reduction
in output in many of the countries. Fig. 2 indicates that a rise in money
supply increases output in all African countries. Moreover, Fig. 3 reveals
that following nominal exchange rate depreciation, output initially contracts
but later expands in some African countries. But in Morocco and Uganda,
nominal exchange rate depreciation seems to have no e¤ect on output after
the fth quarter. As shown in Fig. 4, external debt shocks initially reduce
output in African countries. Output later increases over the sixth quarter.
The IRFs in Fig.5 show the impact of productivity shocks on output. Follow-
ing productivity shocks, output declines on impact but later expands in some
African countries. This may be attributed to existence of nancial frictions.
But in Uganda output increases after productivity shocks. Fig. 6 generally
shows that positive commodity price shocks initially lower output on impact
in African countries but output later increases. In Fig.7, output declines in
African countries after a positive shock to foreign interest rate.
The IRFs in Fig.8 reveal the e¤ects of foreign output shocks on domestic
output. In six of the countries, domestic output increases after the positive
foreign output shocks. However, in Malawi, Morocco, Tunisia and Uganda,
domestic output declines. Fig. 9 indicates that following foreign input price
shocks, output increases in all the countries except in Uganda. This largely
reects trade channel e¤ects where a rise in foreign input price worsens the
terms of trade, increases the trade balance and output. In Fig. 10, except in
Morocco, output declines on impact after foreign ination shocks but later
rise for African countries. Lastly, real exchange rate shocks reduce output
on impact but output later rises.
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2.7 Forecast error variance decomposition of output at di¤erent
horizons
The variance decomposition (Table 4A and 4B) is employed to show the rel-
ative contribution of each structural shock to output uctuations in African
countries at di¤erent horizons. Generally, the variance decomposition shows
that both internal and external shocks signicantly inuence output varia-
tions in African economies. The decomposition, however, reveals that inter-
nal shocks are mainly dominant in the 4th quarter. External shocks appear
to be the most persistent shocks driving output swings in African coun-
tries. This reects in their dominance over the 8th and 16th quarters. The
inuence of external shocks in the 8th and 16th quarters may be due to
African countries exposures to trade and nancial shocks. External shocks
also have greater impact on output uctuations in all African countries except
in Uganda.
A disaggregation of external shocks reveals the most important external
shocks driving output uctuations in African economies. Nominal exchange
rate shocks account for some of the variance of output in African countries.
Exchange rate depreciation may increase the cost of capital, reduce invest-
ment and output. Depreciation may also worsen countrys balance sheet,
increase debt service payments and reduce output. Moreover, external debt
shocks signicantly contribute to output uctuations in some African coun-
tries. High external debt increases the risk premium and the cost of capital
and lowers output. This is related to the ndings by Hsing (2003) for Brazil.
In addition, foreign interest rate shocks signicantly a¤ect output variations
in Africa. A positive shock to foreign interest rate may not only increase
spread and debt service cost but may also cause capital outow in African
countries. These will lead to a decline in investment and output. Similarly,
output uctuations is a¤ected by commodity price shocks. The e¤ects of
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commodity price shocks have been found to be asymmetric in African coun-
tries. While negative commodity price shocks have been found to hamper
growth, positive price shocks have not promoted growth (see, Dehn, 2000).
Also found to inuence output swings is foreign input price shocks. A positive
shock to foreign input price may increase output through the trade channel
or decrease output through the supply shock channel. This reinforces the
ndings by Kose and Riezman (2001) for African economies. Lastly, for-
eign ination and foreign output shocks play minimal role in the variance of
output.
Furthermore, among internal shocks, money supply shocks contribute most
to output uctuations in many African countries. This is similar to the nd-
ings by Kandil (2014) for developing countries. An increase in money supply
reduces the cost of borrowing, increases investment and output. Other dom-
inant internal shock that inuence output uctuations is the productivity
shocks. This demonstrates the signicance of supply shocks in output dy-
namics. This is in line with ndings by Ho¤maister and Roldós (2001) for
Korea. A positive productivity shock lowers the cost of production and in-
creases output. The interest rate shocks only play a minor role in output
swings for African economies. This is comparable to the results by Kanczuk
(2004) for Brazil.
The dominance of external shocks in output uctuations in African countries
can be attributed to their dependence on exports of few primary commodi-
ties, reliance on foreign inputs for domestic production, and exposure to
foreign currency denominated debt. These expose them to commodity price
uctuations, exchange rate volatility and world interest rate shocks. The
signicance of external shocks in inuencing output uctuations in African
countries raises the question over their exchange rate system. While many
African countries maintain that their national currencies are oating, em-
pirical ndings suggest otherwise. Slavov (2011) nds that many African
43
countries operate soft peg and display "fear of oating". The tendency to
defend the exchange rate may be responsible for the greater impacts of ex-
ternal shocks in African economies. The fear of oating may be attributed
to liability dollarization, high level of exchange rate pass-through and low
level of nancial development in African countries.
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2.8 Historical decomposition of output
Fig. 12-21 in appendix 2.2 plot the historical decomposition of output for
the ten African countries. Fig. 12 represents the historical decomposition of
output in Egypt. Productivity, external debt, nominal exchange rate and for-
eign input price shocks are the most important shocks responsible for output
uctuations. Fig. 13 shows that money supply, external debts, productivity
and foreign interest rate shocks are the most important shocks to GDP in
Ghana. Fig. 14 indicates that money supply, productivity, external debt and
commodity price shocks contribute to GDP swings in Kenya. Fig. 15 reveals
that commodity price, productivity, external debt, and nominal exchange
rate shocks are the important shocks a¤ecting output variations in Malawi.
Moreover, Fig. 16 reveals that money supply, external debt, productivity,
and foreign interest rate shocks inuence GDP movements in Morocco. Fig.
17 presents that productivity, external debt, commodity price, and foreign
interest rate shocks trigger output uctuations in Nigeria. Evidence in Fig.
18 suggests that foreign interest rate, external debt, commodity price, and
foreign input price shocks are responsible for output uctuations in South
Africa. Fig. 19 displays that commodity price, productivity, interest rate
and foreign input price shocks inuence output movements in Tunisia. In
Uganda, as shown in Fig. 29, money supply, external debt, foreign input
price, and commodity price shocks inuence output variations. Lastly,
Fig. 20 demonstrates that money supply, productivity, commodity price,
and nominal exchange rate shocks induce output swings in Zambia.
The dominance of external debt shocks among the shocks indicate the e¤ect of
high debt service payment on African economies. The requirement to service
debt decreases funds available for investment and consequently contracts
output in African countries (see Fosu, 1999). Moreover, the signicance of
commodity price shocks illustrates the dependence of African countries on a
narrow range of primary exports for their scal revenue and foreign exchange
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earnings. Hence, commodity price shocks a¤ect the budgetary framework and
the exchange rate (see Spatafora and Samake, 2012; Iwayemi and Fowowe,
2012). Productivity and money supply shocks also account for much output
variations in African countries. This shows the importance of supply shocks
in African economies (see Jidoud, 2012).
2.9. Conclusion
This paper investigates the shocks generating macroeconomic uctuations in
African countries. An open economy monetary DSGE model was developed
and estimated with the Bayesian technique for ten African countries. Gen-
erally, the ndings indicate that the structural shocks that cause economic
uctuations are similar across African economies. Our variance decomposi-
tion analysis shows that both internal and external shocks are responsible for
macroeconomic uctuations in African countries. However, external shocks
account for greater variations in output than internal shocks. Internal shocks
only dominate in the fourth quarter. External shocks signicantly inuence
output at longer horizons; in the eighth and sixteenth quarters . Among
external shocks, the exchange rate and external debt shocks are the main
sources of output uctuations. Among internal shocks, money supply and
productivity shocks also account for signicant output uctuations in African
countries.
In terms of persistence, we nd that external shocks are the most persis-
tent shocks inuencing output uctuations. Listing specic shocks from high
to low persistence, we nd that external debt, exchange rate, foreign in-
put price, foreign interest rate, and commodity price shocks have signicant
persistent e¤ect on output variations in African countries. External shocks
induce signicant economic uctuations in African countries under oating
and xed exchange rate regime. The similarity of shocks impacting oaters
and non-oaters may be due to the fear of oating which induces the mone-
tary authorities to use reserves to limit exchange rate uctuations (see Calvo
48
and Reinhart, 2002). The result is similar to the ndings by Flood and Rose
(1995) and Ma´ckowiak (2007) and di¤ers from the ndings by Sissoko and
Diboo¼glu (2006) for African countries. Among internal shocks, we nd pro-
ductivity shocks to be the most persistent in a¤ecting output. Other internal
shocks that are found to be persistent in inuencing output are money supply
shocks and domestic interest rate.
The signicance of external shocks in inuencing economic uctuations in
African countries since the 1990s may be due to several factors. Since the
early 1990s, African countries have implemented series of economic reforms
ranging from privatization, commercialization to trade liberalization. There
has also been improvement in democratic accountability and economic man-
agement. All these might have reduced the inuence of internal shocks on
economic uctuations in African countries. Moreover, on the international
front, African countries have become more open to trade and FDI and com-
modity prices have increased more than the previous decades. All these, on
the other hand, have increased the signicance of external shocks in inuenc-
ing macroeconomic uctuations in African countries (see Raddatz, 2008).
The results of the study have important policy implications for African
economies. In view of the vulnerability of African economies to external
shocks, it is imperative that African countries formulate appropriate ex-
change rate policies, devise sound external debt management, and use hedg-
ing instruments to insulate or mitigate the e¤ects of external shocks . Since
many of these economies rely heavily on very few, if not one, commodities for
foreign exchange earnings, it is necessary that these countries pursue policies
that promote industrial diversication. Another way in which African coun-
tries can create a bu¤er against adverse external shocks is to set up sovereign
wealth funds (SWFs). These funds can be used to reduce macroeconomic
volatility arising from commodity price boom-bust cycles. Establishment of
SWFs with transparent rules of operation can be used to support balanced
49
scal positions and promote macroeconomic stability.
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3.0 Appendices
Appendix 2.1: Impulse response functions
Fig1.Dynamic response of output to interest rate shocks
Fig. 2. Dynamic response of output to money supply shocks
Fig.3. Dynamic response of output to nominal exchange rate shocks
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Fig.4. Dynamic response of output to external debt shocks
Fig.5. Dynamic response of output to productivity shocks
Fig.6. Dynamic response of output to commodity price shocks
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Fig.7. Dynamic response of output to foreign interest rate shocks
Fig.8. Dynamic response of output to foreign output shocks
Fig.9. Dynamic response of output to foreign input price shocks
Fig.10. Dynamic response of output to foreign ination shocks
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Fig.11. Dynamic response of output to real exchange rate shocks
Appendix 2.2: Historical decomposition of GDP
Fig. 12. Historical decomposition of GDP in Egypt
Fig. 13. Historical decomposition of GDP in Ghana
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Fig. 14. Historical decomposition of GDP in Kenya
Fig. 15. Historical decomposition of GDP in Malawi
Fig. 16. Historical decomposition of GDP in Morocco
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Fig. 17. Historical decomposition of GDP in Nigeria
Fig. 18. Historical decomposition of GDP in South Africa
Fig. 19. Historical decomposition of GDP in Tunisia
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Fig. 20. Historical decomposition of GDP in Uganda
Fig. 21. Historical decomposition of GDP in Zambia
Appendix 2.3: Prior vs posterior
Fig. 22. Prior vs posterior
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Fig. 23. Prior vs posterior
Fig. 24. Prior vs posterior
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CHAPTER THREE
The Balance Sheet Channel in African Economies
Abstract
This study investigates the quantitative signicance of the balance sheet
channel in African economies. We formulate and estimate an open economy
monetary DSGE model where entrepreneurs nance investment by issuing
foreign currency-denominated debt. We estimate the model with Bayesian
technique. Our Bayesian estimation shows that the balance sheet e¤ects
are empirically important in African economies. The marginal likelihood
results clearly favour the model with nancial imperfections. Moreover, the
ndings indicate that the balance sheet e¤ect reduces the e¤ectiveness of
monetary policy, raises the sensitivity of the risk premium to external debt,
and contracts output following exchange rate depreciation.
3.1. Introduction
Financial market imperfections have been identied as one of the ampliers of
relatively small shocks to the aggregate economy (see Bernanke et al., 1999;
Christensen and Dib, 2008). In a small open economy with foreign currency-
denominated debt, nancial market frictions dampen the e¤ect of devaluation
via the balance sheet channel (see Céspedes et al., 2004; Bebczuk et al., 2006).
This balance sheet e¤ect is found to be responsible for declining output in
East Asia and Latin America after a currency devaluation (see Krugman,
1999; Aguiar, 2005; Mulder et al. 2012). In addition, evidence suggests
that balance sheet weaknesses arising from foreign currency debt triggered
nancial instability in emerging economies in the 1990s (Eichengreen and
Hausmann, 1999; Bordo, et al., 2010).
The gap that this study seeks to ll is to evaluate the quantitative signi-
cance of the balance sheet channel in African economies. Given the inability
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of African countries to borrow in their own currencies, the balance sheet ef-
fect might be an important channel for the propagation of shocks in African
countries. Foreign currency-denominated debt exposes the balance sheets
of rms and countries to exchange rate volatility. Moreover, due to nan-
cial market imperfections, African countries borrow at a premium. This
makes their balance sheets equally vulnerable to foreign interest rate shocks.
Despite the growing importance of the balance sheet channel, especially in
developing countries, there has been dearth of empirical studies focusing on
African countries. Rather, studies have focused on Asia and Latin America
(e.g., Benavente et al., 2003; Bordo et al., 2010; Bleakley and Cowan, 2008).
This study is signicant for the conduct of monetary policy particularly, the
question of whether monetary policy should react to exchange rate uctua-
tions or not. Should the monetary authority implement tight or loose policy
when the currency depreciates? The study is also important for the choice
of exchange rate regime. While Cook (2004) advocates for a xed exchange
rate regime when the balance sheet e¤ect is empirically important, Céspedes
et al. (2004) argue for a exible exchange rate system. In addition, the study
is important for the conduct of scal operation. Findings show that exposure
to foreign currency debt constrains the use of scal policy instruments to deal
with economic shocks (see, Jeanne and Zettelmeyer, 2002). A depreciation
of the exchange rate weakens the government net worth and limits its ability
to borrow to nance pubic investment.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in three respects. First,
building on the works of Bernanke et al. (1999) and Céspedes et al. (2004),
we formulate an open economy monetary DSGE model with nancial market
imperfection for African economies. Second, we investigate the quantitative
signicance of the balance sheet e¤ect in the propagation of economic uc-
tuations in African economies. Third, to highlight the heterogeneity of each
country, we use the Bayesian technique to estimate our model for each of the
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nine (9) African economies.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing
literature on the balance sheet channel. Section 3 constructs the model for
the study. Section 4 describes the data and presents the estimated results.
Section 5 concludes and makes policy recommendations.
3.2. Review of literature
Empirical literature on the propagation of economic shocks has identied
nancial market imperfections as one of the factors responsible for amplica-
tion of relatively small shocks. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1996) show that under asymmetric information where borrowers
net worth determines the cost of capital, credit market frictions amplify eco-
nomic uctuations. Similarly, Bernanke et al. (1999) develop a nancial
accelerator framework where developments in the credit markets propagate
and magnify shocks to the real economy. This works through the external
nance premium which is determined by the net worth of the rms.
The nancial accelerator model proposed by Bernanke et al. (1999) has been
extended to an open economy to evaluate the role of nancial frictions when
a country debt is denominated in foreign currency. Aghion et al. (2000) show
that in the presence of nominal rigidities, a currency depreciation leads to an
increase in the rms debt burden and a decline in prot and net worth. Con-
sequently, this may constrain the rmsaccess to credit, reduce investment
and lower output. In a related study, Aghion et al. (2004) provide evidence
that corporate balance sheets play a signicant role in the amplication of
currency crises. The lower output brought about by the deterioration of
rms balance sheets will result in a fall in money demand, and thus lead to
a currency depreciation. Céspedes et al. (2004) show that in an economy
with foreign currency-denominated debt, a currency depreciation increases
debt service payment and deteriorates the balance sheets of rms and banks.
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Studies investigating the empirical signicance of the balance sheet chan-
nel in emerging economies have reported mixed results. Forbes (2002) nds
that following a currency depreciation, rms with foreign sale exposure have
higher growth performance, while rms with higher debt ratio have lower
growth performance in emerging economies. Carranza et al. (2003) nd that
for rms having dollar debt in Peru, real exchange rate depreciation leads
to a decline in investment. Echeverry et al. (2003) nd that rms with lia-
bility dollarization exhibit negative balance sheet e¤ects during devaluation
in Colombia. Pratap et al. (2003), Pratap and Urrutia (2004), and Aguiar
(2005) nd that exchange rate depreciation increases the debt burden and
reduces investment in Mexico. Bordo et al. (2010) nd evidence of balance
sheet e¤ect in a sample of rms in 45 countries. Mulder et al. (2012) nd
that corporate balance sheet and maturity mismatch play signicant role in
the amplication of Asian economic crises.
In contrast, a number of studies have found the balance sheet e¤ect to be
statistically insignicant in emerging economies. The competitive e¤ect of ex-
change rate depreciation has been found to dominate the balance sheet e¤ect.
For instance, the competitive e¤ect dominates when exchange rate depreci-
ation increases the demand for a countrys exports, decreases the domestic
demand for imports, and increases the trade balance and output. Benavente
et al. (2003) nd that the competitive e¤ect of currency depreciation dom-
inates the balance sheet e¤ect in Chile. Hence, currency depreciation leads
to an expansion of investment. Similarly, Bonomo et al. (2003) nd no
evidence of the balance sheet e¤ect in Brazil. Bleakley and Cowan (2008)
nd that competitive e¤ect of depreciation dominates the balance sheet ef-
fect in 5 Latin American countries. The results indicate that rms with
dollar-denominated debt do not reduce their investment after depreciation.
A related strand of literature employs macro data to assess the importance of
the balance sheet channel in an open economy. For instance, Berganza et al.
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(2004) nd that devaluation increases the countrys risk premium, reduces
investment and output in emerging economies. Céspedes (2005) nds that
the balance sheet e¤ect has a negative impact on output in developed and
emerging economies. The impact, however, depends on the level of external
debt and nancial deepness. Elekdag et al. (2006) nd that the balance sheet
channel magnied the impact of shocks during the Korean crises. Using a
panel of 57 countries, Bebczuk et al. (2006) nd that liability dollarization
diminishes the expansionary e¤ects of devaluation in the countries where
external debt as a proportion of GDP is high.
Given the nancial intermediary role of banks, some studies have focused
on the role of banks balance sheet in the propagation and magnication
of shocks to the real economy. Choi and Cook (2004) and Chue and Cook
(2008) show that exchange rate depreciation deteriorates the bank balance
sheet, constraints credit supply and reduces economic activity in emerging
economies. Céspedes (2005) nds that real exchange rate devaluation worsens
bank balance sheets and negatively a¤ects output in developing countries.
Blejer et al. (2002) and Beck et al. (2006) show that through their balance
sheet, the bank play active role in the propagation of terms of trade volatility
in emerging economies.
Evidently, the empirical literature has been inconclusive on the quantitative
signicance of the balance sheet e¤ect in an economy. The main determinant
of the balance sheet e¤ect appears to be the level of external debt and the
level of nancial development. High level of foreign currency-denominated
debt reduces the expansionary e¤ect exchange rate depreciation on the econ-
omy through the deterioration in the net worth and balance sheet of rms.
This increases the cost of capital and debt service payment and contracts
output. Similarly, low level of nancial development exacerbates the impact
of exchange rate shocks by further tightening the credit constraint.
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3.3. The model
3.3.1 Households
There is a continuum of households that maximize utility subject to a stan-
dard budget constraint. Given the increasing holding of foreign currency in
Africa by households as noted in Elkhaf (2002), we assume that households
allocate a fraction of their real holdings between domestic and foreign cur-
rencies , so that StMt = %Mt, where St is the nominal exchange rate, M

t is
foreign nominal money and Mt is domestic nominal money. Our representa-
tive household preferences is dened by the following utility function:
Ut =
1X
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where Ct, is the aggregate consumption, MtPt is the real balances, and Nt is
units of labour. The parameter h measures the degree of habit formation.
The parameter  is the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient ;   (0; 1) is the
discount factor;  is the inverse of the Frisch labour supply elasticity and 
represents interest rate elasticity of money demand.
The budget constraint is:
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where Dt , is the ratio of external debt to the GDP, Wt; is the wage rate, Qt;
is the price of capital, rt is the nominal interest rate, prt, is the risk premium,
and rdt is the debt service payment. Households enter period t with domestic
money holdings Mt, bonds Bt, and foreign debt Dt :
Households choose the path of Ct;Mt; Nt, Bt; and Dt and that maximize
expected utility. The rst order conditions are:
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where equations (3) - (7) denote the derivatives of the utility function to its
arguments.
We equate Eqs.(3) and (4) to derive the intertemporal consumption func-
tion which is further linearized to give the aggregate dynamic consumption
equation:
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ect = h (   1)
c
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whereedenotes percentage deviation from the steady state and c =  +
h (   1). Eq.(8) is the standard consumption equation showing that con-
sumption depends on past and expected future consumption and real interest
rate. Consumption also depends positively on current real balances and neg-
atively on expected real balances (Castelnuovo, 2012).
In line with McCallum and Nelson (2000), our macro-balance for a small
open economy is:
ey = cect + xext   zezt + "g;t (9)
where eyt;ect; ext; ezt are percentage deviations of output, consumption, exports,
and imports from their steady states respectively. c; x; z are steady state
ratios of consumption, exports and imports to output. "g;t is the government
expenditure and investment shocks. Our net export function is given by:
fnxt = yfeyft   yeyt + rfrert (10)
where eyft , yf , y, and r, are the foreign output, elasticity of net export to
foreign output, the elasticity of net export to domestic output, and sum of
elasticity of substitution in production for home and abroad respectively .
The real exchange rate is dened as frert  est+ ept   ept. Substituting Eq.(10)
in Eq.(9) yields the expression:
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Substituting Eq.(11) into Eq.(8) yields a dynamic IS equation:
eyt = h (   1)
c
eyt 1 + 
c
Eteyt+1   c
c
 
1 + y
 (ert   Etet+1)
  c
c
 
1 + y
 eprt + c
c
 
1 + y
 emt   c
c
 
1 + y
Et emt+1 (12)
  %c
s0c
 
1 + y
est + %c
s0c
 
1 + y
Etest+1
 h (   1) r
c
 
1 + y
 frert 1 + r 
1 + y
 frert   r
c
 
1 + y
Etfrert+1
 h (   1) yf
c
 
1 + y
 eyft 1 + yf 1 + yeyft   yfc  1 + yEteyft+1 + "yt
We assume that the innovation "yt follows a rst-order autoregeresiive process
as "yt = a"
y
t 1+
a
t . Eq.(12) is an open economy IS equation where domestic
output also depends on nominal and real exchange rate and foreign output.
As a contribution, our dynamic IS equation equally features output as a
function of external nance premium and as a function of lags and leads of
real exchange rates and foreign outputs.
3.3.2 Firms
We adopt the hybrid, Calvo-style New Keynesian Phillips curve proposed by
Galí and Gertler (1999) and Galí et al. (2001) of the following form:
et = fEtet+1 + bet 1 + mct (13)
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where
f  f + ! [1   (1  )]g 1;  (1  ) (1  ) (1  !) 
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)]g 1;  
(1  )
1 +  ("  1)f + ! [1   (1  )]g
 1
Similar to Smets and Wouters (2002), we assume a Leontief technology for
labour and capital inputs. Labour and capital inputs are used in xed pro-
portion of output Yt. The production function is written as:
Yt = min

At'KK

t ; At'NN
1 
t

(14)
where At is technology shocks common to all rms, Kt is the units of capital,
Nt is the units of labour, 'K and 'N are the proportion of capital and labour
used in output production. The total cost is given as:
TCt = wtNt + rtKt (15)
where wt is the real wage and rt is the nominal interest rate. We can write
the real marginal cost as:
mct = wt
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(16)
Linearising Eq.(16) around the steady state and incorporating Eq.(11), we
get the following relationship for the marginal cost:
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We can then insert Eq.(17) in Eq.(13) to get the following extended version
of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) of the following form:
et = fEtet+1 + bet 1 + (aeyt   beyt 1 + cfrert + deyft 1
 efrert 1   feyft + g emt + hest + bert   deat) + "t (18)
The ination disturbance is assumed to follow an AR(1) process: "t =
f"

t 1 + 
f
t . In eq.(18), ination depends positively on past and expected
future ination, past and current output, and the real balances. As our
contribution, ination also depends on nominal exchange and real exchange
rates.
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3.3.3 Exchange rate and external debt
We equate (6) and (7) to derive the uncovered interest parity condition (UIP)
expression. We assume erdt = erft   !qeqt + !d edt . This implies that external
debt service payment depends positively on the foreign interest rates and the
level of external debt to GDP ratio, and negatively on commodity prices.
The UIP expression is further linearised to yield:
est = Etest+1   (ert   erft )  !qeqt + !d edt + "ert (19)
where est is nominal exchange rate, (ert   erft ) is interest rate di¤erential, eqt is
commodity price, and edt is ratio of external debt to GDP. The innovation is
assumed to follow an AR(1) process with an IID-Normal error term: "ert =
d"
er
t 1+
d
t . The coe¢ cients !q and !d represent exchange rate elasticity with
respect to commodity price and external debt respectively. Eq.(19) suggests
a positive link between exchange rate and external debt to GDP ratio.
The dynamics of external debt depend on the current account balance and
foreign debt service payment. Thus, the external debt to GDP ratio evolves
according to the following equation:
Dt
PtYt
=
Zt  Xt
Yt
+
 
1 + rdt 1

dt 1 (20)
where D

t
PtYt
is the ratio of external debt to GDP, Zt Xt
Yt
represents the current
account balance by the private sector and rdt is the interest rate on external
debt. The change in the debt ratio over time can then be written as:
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1 + rdt 1   t 1  yt 1

(21)
Eq.(21) shows that the change in the external debt ratio is a positive function
of net import and foreign interest rate. For example, a rise in net imports
is nanced by borrowing thereby increasing the existing level of debt. Simi-
larly, an increase in interest rate on external debt increases the debt service
payment and therefore puts upward pressure on the debt ratio. We linearize
Eq.(21) and substitute Eq.(10) to derive the equation for the dynamics of the
external debt ratio. Note that from Eq.(19) we have rdt = r
f
t   !qeqt + !d edt
and we substitute (zt   xt) = fnxt = yfeyft   yeyt + rfrert. Using this fact,
we have the debt equation as follows:
edt = a edt 1 + berft   ceyt   deyt   eeqt   f frert   geyft + "et (22)
where
a =
(1 + g0) + r0
d
; b =
r0
d
; c =
(1 + g0) y
d0d
;
d =
r0 + (1 + g0)
3
(1 + g0)
; ; e =
r0!q
d
;
f =
(1 + g0) r
d0d
; g =
(1 + g0) yf
d0d
; d = (1 + g0)
2   r0!d
The external debt shock follows an AR(1) process: "et = e"
r
t 1+
e
t . Eq.(22)
describes the external debt evolution where g0, and r0, represent average
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growth rate and average interest rate respectively. There is a negative rela-
tion between external debt and commodity prices. Positive commodity price
shocks generate more revenue for the government to payo¤ existing external
debt. In addition, external debt to GDP depends negatively on domestic
output and positively on foreign output. This indicates that a fall in domes-
tic output increases external debt to GDP while a rise in foreign output leads
to a rise in external debt to GDP.
3.3.4 The entrepreneur
Similar to Céspedes et al.(2004) and Cook (2004), the entrepreneurs net
worth is dened as assets minus liabilities. Hence, net worth is written as:
NWt = Yt   rft StDt (23)
where NWt is the net worth, Yt is output, r
f
t is the foreign interest rate, St
is the exchange rate, and Dt is foreign currency debt respectively. From
Eq.(23), a rise in the exchange rate (depreciation) reduces the net worth of
entrepreneur. This underlines the susceptibility of the rmsbalance sheet
to exchange rate uctuations. Eq.(23) is linearized to give:
fnwt = 'y eyt   'r erft + est + edt (24)
where 'y =
Y0
NWo
and 'r =
rf0S0D

0
NW0
. The denotation Y0
NWo
represents the
steady state ratio of average output to the net worth of the entrepreneur
while r
f
0S0D

0
NW0
is the steady state leverage ratio times the steady state interest
rate. Similar to Elekda¼g et al.(2006) and Elekda¼g and Tchakarov (2007),
the external nance premium can be written as an increasing function of the
domestic currency value of debt relative to net worth:
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Et (1 + prt) =

StD

t
NWt
 p
(25)
where Et (1 + prt) is the expected external nancing premium and  p is the
elasticity of external nance premium with respect to the rms leverage
ratio. A depreciation of the exchange rate will increase the leverage ratio,
which in turn increases the external nance premium of the rm. This hin-
ders investment and magnies the e¤ects of exchange rate shocks on output.
Eq.(25) is log-linearized to give:
eprt =  p est + edt   fnwt (26)
Substituting Eq.(24) in Eq.(25), we derive the log-linearized equation for the
external nance premium
eprt =  p (1 + 'r) est +  p (1 + 'r) edt +  p'rerft    p'yeyt (27)
Eq.(27) indicates that the external nance premium is positively related to
foreign interest rate, exchange rate, and foreign currency debt, but negatively
related to output. A rise in the foreign interest rate can depreciate the
exchange rate, increase the debt service payment, worsen the net worth and
increase the external nance premium. Similarly, an increase in the external
debt may lower the net worth and increase the external nance premium.
Lastly, an output expansion increases the net worth and reduces the external
nance premium.
3.3.5 Money market
We equate Eqs.(4) and (6) and linearize to derive the money market equation.
We then substitute Eqs.(10) and (11) to get the following money market
equation:
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where
r =
s0(1 + r0 + pr0)
m0(1  ) ;s = s0(1 + r0 + pr0).
The interest rate shocks follow an AR(1) process: "bt = b"
r
t 1 + 
b
t . Eq.(28)
describes the money market equation. Interest rate depends positively on
real output and negatively on real balances. Also, interest rate depends pos-
itively on current exchange rate and negatively on expected future exchange
rate. Our money market equation also indicates that interest rate depends
negatively on real exchange rate, foreign output, and risk premium.
3.3.6 Monetary policy
Given monetary aggregate targeting in Africa, we follow Muhanji and Ojah
(2011) in the specication of our monetary policy reaction function. Money
supply is driven by the ination gap, the output gap and commodity price
gap. We also include the real exchange rate in our monetary aggregate
Taylor-type rule, which has been found to be empirically relevant for emerg-
ing market economies (see, Mohanty and Klau, 2004). The monetary aggre-
gate Taylor-type rule is therefore:
emt = m emt 1   (1  m)[et + yeyt + rerfrert + qeqt] + "mt ; (29)
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where all variables are in percentage deviations from the steady states. emt
is monetary aggregate, et is ination rate; eyt is output gap; frert is the real
exchange rate gap, eqt is the commodity price gap. The uncorrelated monetary
disturbance follows an AR(1) process: "mt = c"
r
t 1 + 
c
t . The parameter m
is the policy rate smoothing,  is policy response to ination gap, y is
policy response to output gap, rer is policy response to real exchange rate
shocks, and q is policy response to commodity price shocks.
The equations to be estimated are summarised as follows:
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berft   ceyt   deyt   eeqt   f frert   geyft + "et (35)et = fEtet+1 + bet 1 + mct (36)
mct = faeyt   beyt 1 + cfrert + deyft 1   efrert   feyft (37)
+g emt + hest + bert   deat
The structural shock processes in the model are given as:
et =  et + ";t; ";t  N  0; 2 (38)
where
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";t =
heqt; erft ; eyft ; finpt; gf inf lti
3.4. Data and estimation
3.4.1 Data source and treatment
Data for the study were obtained from the International Financial statistics
(IFS), the World Bank, Central Bank database of the sample countries. The
model is estimated with quarterly time series data on fourteen macroeco-
nomic variables in nine (9) African countries for the period 1990:12011:4.
Due to data availability, the sample size di¤ers from one country to the other.
For Egypt, 1998:2 2011:4, Ghana, 1990:1 2011:4, Kenya, 1990:1 2011: 4;
Malawi, 1990:1 2007:4; Morocco,1995:4 2011:4; Nigeria, 1990:1 2008:4;
South Africa, 1994:1 2011:4; Uganda, 1993:2 2011:4 ; and Zambia, 1997:
1 2011:3.
The foreign interest rate, real foreign output, foreign ination, and price
of foreign inputs are proxied by LIBOR, US real GDP, US consumer price
index and US producer price index for manufactured goods respectively. The
data were taken from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The commodity
price index was taken from World Bank pink sheet. Real commodity price
is derived by deating the nominal commodity price with the US consumer
price index. Due to non-availability of reliable quarterly GDP data for Malawi
and Nigeria, we use industrial output for the two countries.
3.4.2 Prior distribution of the parameters and calibration
In line with the Bayesian literature, we estimate the model by forming pri-
ors distributions. Similar to Smets and Wouters(2007), the persistence of
the AR(1) processes is assumed to be beta distributed with mean 0.5 and
standard deviation 0.2. The standard errors of the shocks are assumed to be
distributed according to inverse-gamma distribution with a mean of 0.1 and
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two degrees of freedom. As in García and González (2013), we use the same
prior values for all the countries in our sample. This allows the data to reveal
the degree of t of these values to the realities of the countries. However, the
sample draws for the convergence of Metropolis-Hastings (M-H) algorithm
di¤er among countries4. The countries converge at di¤erent M-H draws.
Similar to Castelnuovo (2012), we assume the habit parameter h to be a beta
distribution with a mean 0.7 and standard deviation 0.1 and money-interest
rate elasticity  to be a beta distribution with mean 0.2 and standard error
0.05. The degree of price stickiness  and price indexation ! are assumed
to be beta distributed with mean 0.65 and 0.5 and standard errors 0.1 and
0.15 respectively. Following Elkhaf (2002), the parameter for currency sub-
stitution % is assumed to be a beta distribution with mean 0.3 and standard
deviation of 0.14. Our prior for external premium elasticity 'p = 0:05. This
is similar to the estimates by Christensen and Dib (2008).
Finally, the monetary policy reaction function parameters follow the Taylors
rule. The long run reaction to output
 
y

and ination () are assumed
to be a normal distribution with mean 0.12 and 1.5 and standard error 0.05
and 0.25 respectively. The monetary smoothing parameter m is assumed
to beta distribution with a mean 0.75 and standard error 0.1. Lastly, the
monetary policy function parameters to commodity price shocks
 
q

and
real exchange (rer) rate is assumed to be a beta mean 0.5 and standard
error 0.1 each.
Some parameters are calibrated for the study. The model calibration is sum-
marized in Table 1. The calibration of , , and  , comes from Smets and
Wouters (2007). The value chosen for  is standard in the literature. The
calibration for " comes from Castelnuovo (2012). The values chosen for y,
4The M-H algorithm draws are: Egypt (100,000), Ghana, (100,000), Kenya, (50,000),
Malawi, (50,000), Morocco, (2,000)Nigeria, (100,000), South Africa, (100,000), Tunisia,
(20,000), Uganda, (100,000), and Zambia, (5,000)
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r, c, and yf = 0:25 come from McCallum and Nelson (2000).
Table 3.1: Calibration of parameter
 = 0:99 " = 6
 = 1:5  = 0:33
y = 0:25 c = 0:58
r = 0:66 yf = 0:25
ls = 0:5
3.4.3 Empirical results
Table 2A and 2B present the posterior mean estimates along with the [5th,
95th] posterior percentile of the estimated structural parameters. We con-
trast the model with nancial frictions (FA) where the elasticity of external
nance premium 'p = 0:05 with model without the nancial frictions (NFA)
where there is no external nance premium, 'p = 0:00: Firstly, the elasticity
of external nance premium 'p is signicantly di¤erent from zero for all the
countries. This indicates the statistical signicance of the nancial acceler-
ator channel in African countries. This is similar to the ndings by Elekdag
et al. (2006) for South Korea. Moreover, this implies that African economies
are vulnerable to shocks a¤ecting the aggregate balance sheets. A negative
shock that depreciates the exchange rate may deteriorate the net worth and
worsen the balance sheets of rms. Consequently, this increases the cost of
borrowing, lowers investment and contracts output.
Based on the standard for model comparison in the Bayesian literature (see
Coop, 2007; von Heideken, 2009; Castelnuovo, 2012), we compare the mar-
ginal likelihoods between the models with and without nancial frictions.
The ratio of the marginal likelihoods (the posterior odds ratio) clearly favours
the model with nancial frictions. The marginal likelihood estimates for the
model with nancial frictions are higher than for the model without in seven
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African countries. There is a strong evidence of balance sheet channel in
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia. In con-
trast, the marginal likelihood estimates do not favour model with nancial
imperfection in Egypt and Morocco.
The presence of the balance sheet channel indicates that African economies
are vulnerable to exchange rate and foreign interest rate shocks. Given their
large exposure to foreign currency-denominated debt (see Sy, 2013), exchange
rate depreciation will worsen their balance sheets, increase the risk premium
and cost of debt service and consequently lower output. Through the balance
sheet channel, exchange rate depreciation may contract rather than expand
output in African economies. As observed by Bebczuk et al. (2006), liability
dollarization dampens the expansionary e¤ect of exchange rate depreciation
in highly indebted countries. The policy implication is that purely oating
exchange rate regime may not be optimal for African countries with foreign
currency-denominated debt.
Importantly, our results show that the balance sheet e¤ect weakens the im-
pact of money in business cycle uctuations. The parameter estimates for
the preferences for non-separability between consumption and real balances
() are lower under the model with nancial accelerator. This suggests that
the balance sheet e¤ect reduces the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy trans-
mission in African countries. This may be due to the existence of foreign
currency-denominated debt which makes the impact of monetary policy on
the exchange rate to further exacerbate the debt problem thereby reducing
the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy. This is in line with the ndings by Kam-
ber and Thoenissen (2012). The authors nd that the output response to
monetary policy shocks is attenuated by the presence of nancial imperfec-
tion. A restrictive monetary policy seems to be the optimal response when
debt is denominated in foreign currency (see Aghion et al. 2001).
Moreover, the estimates indicate that the response of sovereign risk to exter-
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nal debt (!d) are higher under the model with nancial frictions. This shows
that the net worth of the country signicantly a¤ects its cost of borrowing.
When a country debt is denominated in foreign currency, a depreciation of
the exchange rate worsens the countrys balance sheet, increases the cost of
debt service and the countrys risk premium. Consequently, this increases
the level of external debt and further increases the risk premium.This is in
line with the ndings by Berganza et al. (2004) and Korinek (2011) that
exchange rate depreciation increases a countrys risk premium when the bal-
ance sheet e¤ect is signicant. The policy implication of this is that African
countries should deepen their domestic bond markets so as to reduce their
exposure to foreign currency-denominated debt.
In a manner similar to Christensen and Dib (2008), we examine the estimates
of the monetary policy parameters especially the coe¢ cient that measures
the response of monetary policy to deviation of output
 
y

. This is to check
whether the monetary authority in Africa countries react more aggressively
under the model with nancial accelerator mechanism given its propensity
to amplify shocks. We nd this not to be robust for African countries as
only three countriesmonetary authorities react more aggressively to output
deviation under the nancial accelerator model. This may imply that the
monetary authorities prefer to react more to other variables that a¤ect the
balance sheet of rms as shown in their response to real exchange rate devi-
ation. In view of the muted e¤ect of monetary policy on output under the
model with nancial accelerator mechanism, the monetary authority should
respond more aggressively to exchange rate uctuations.
Given the relative contribution of commodity price shocks to exchange rate
and macroeconomic uctuations in African countries (see Kose and Riezman.
2001; 2003; Collier, 2007; Arezki et al., 2012), we examine the response
of monetary policy to deviation of commodity prices in African countries.
The estimated value of
 
q

, the coe¢ cient that measures monetary policy
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response to deviation of commodity prices appear to be more aggressive under
the model with nancial accelerator in six out of the nine African countries.
This implies that the monetary authorities in Africa attempt to minimize the
adverse e¤ect of commodity price uctuations on the the real exchange rate.
This is similar to the results by García and González (2013) for commodity
exporting countries.
On the remaining monetary policy rule, we nd evidence of strong monetary
policy reaction to ination in all the countries. This is in line with the
ndings by Smets and Wouters (2007). The estimates range from 1.25 in
Nigeria to 1.67 in Egypt. Our estimates also indicate a considerable degree
of policy smoothing ranging from 0.76 in Zambia to 0.98 in Egypt. We also
nd that monetary authorities in Africa generally react to real exchange rate
movements. This is with a view to reducing the impact of real exchange
rate uctuations on ination and growth volatility. This is in line with the
ndings by García and González (2013) that monetary authority in emerging
economies react to real exchange rate movement to reduce its destabilizing
e¤ect.
Regarding the other structural parameters, there is evidence of habit forma-
tion in consumption in all the countries. The estimates of habit parameter,
h, range from 0.55 in Malawi to 0.85 in Egypt. There is evidence of foreign
currency holding in all African countries as the estimates of the parameter
for foreign currency holding, %, range from 0.29 in Malawi and Zambia to
0.32 in Egypt. This is close to the estimates by Elkhaf (2002). Turning
to Calvo pricing, the mean of the degree of price stickiness, , ranges from
0.56 in South Africa and Zambia to 0.6 in Ghana and Malawi. This indicates
that prices are re-optimized within every 2-3 quarters. This is similar to the
estimates by Steinbach et al. (2009) for South Africa. The degree of price
indexation, !, ranges from 0.49 in Morocco to 0.70 in Malawi and South
Africa indicating that average of half to to two-third of the price setters are
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backward looking.
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3.5 Impulse response analysis
3.5.1 Exchange rate shocks
Based on the mean of posterior distribution reported in Table 2, Fig. 1
shows the dynamic response of output to exchange rate depreciation under
the baseline model (model without nancial imperfection) and model with
nancial imperfection. In the baseline model, exchange rate depreciation is
expected to expand output through the competitive e¤ect. Exchange rate
depreciation reduces the price of exports relative to the price of imports.
This increases export, the trade balance and output. Under the nancial
accelerator model, however, the balance sheet e¤ect is expected to dominate
the competitive e¤ect thereby leading to a contractionary devaluation. For
example, exchange rate depreciation deteriorates the balance sheet of a rms,
lowers the net worth, increases the cost of capital, lowers investment, and
contracts output.
Generally, Fig.1 indicates that output initially declines after depreciation and
later increases in all the countries under the baseline model. This is in line
with the J-curve hypothesis (see, Stuµcka, 2006; Hsing, 2008). In contrast,
under the model with nancial imperfection, output contracts after exchange
rate depreciation. This indicates that exchange rate depreciation deteriorates
the net worth and the balance sheet of rms. Consequently, this increases the
external nance premium and contracts investment and output. The balance
sheet e¤ect diminishes the expansionary e¤ects of exchange rate depreciation.
This is similar to the ndings by Céspedes et al. (2005) and Bebczuk et al.
(2006).
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Fig. 3.1. Dynamic response of output to exchange rate depreciation.
3.5.2 Monetary policy shocks
Fig.2 presents the dynamic response of output to an expansionary monetary
policy shock under the baseline model (model without nancial imperfec-
tion) and model with nancial imperfection. Under the model without the
nancial imperfection, an expansionary monetary policy shock will lead to
a decline in the interest rate, an increase in investment and an expansion
in output. For the model with nancial imperfection, a monetary expansion
decreases the interest rate, depreciates the exchange rate, deteriorates the
rms balance sheet by lowering the net worth, increases the cost of capi-
tal, reduces investment, and contracts output. An expansionary monetary
policy shocks is contractionary under the model with nancial friction but
expansionary in the baseline model.
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Fig 2 shows that under the model without nancial imperfection, output
initially decreases following an expansionary monetary policy shock but later
expands in all the countries except in Egypt. In Egypt, output continues to
decline after an expansionary monetary policy shock. In contrast, under
model with nancial imperfection, an expansionary monetary policy shock
leads to a contraction in output for all the countries. This may arise as
the decline in the interest rate after a loose monetary policy depreciates
the exchange rate. The depreciation worsens the rms balance sheets, and
dampens investment and output. This is line with the ndings by Cook
(2004).
Fig. 3.2. Dynamic response of output to an expansionary monetary policy shock
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3.5.3 Foreign interest rate shocks
Fig. 3 displays dynamic response of output to positive foreign interest rate
shocks under the baseline model and the model with nancial imperfection.
Under the model with nancial imperfection, a positive shock to the foreign
interest rate depreciates the exchange rate, increases the debt service obliga-
tion, lowers the net worth and thereby deteriorates the balance sheet of rms.
Consequently, the worsening of the balance sheet contracts investment and
output. Under the baseline model, a rise in foreign interest increases the debt
service payment and lowers output. It is expected that output will decline
more under the model with nancial imperfection.
Generally, output declines under the two models after a positive shock to
the foreign interest rate. Output, however, contracts more under the model
with nancial imperfection in African economies. A positive shock to the
foreign interest rate may depreciate the exchange rate. This deteriorates the
net worth and balance sheet of the rms, contracts investment, and lowers
output (see Céspedes et al., 2004). Through this balance channel, the e¤ect
of foreign interest rate shock is amplied in the economy.
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Fig. 3.3. Dynamic response of output to positive foreign interest rate shock.
3.6. Conclusion
The study investigates the quantitative signicance of the balance sheet chan-
nel in African economies. We construct an open economy monetary DSGE
model where the entrepreneurs net worth determines the cost of borrowing.
Using the Bayesian technique, we estimate structural parameters for two
versions of the model: one with and one without the nancial market imper-
fections. In line with Bayesian literature, we employ the marginal likelihood
ratio to compare the t of the two models.
The results indicate that the balance sheet channel is empirically important
in African economies. The marginal likelihood ratio favours the model with
nancial imperfection in seven of the nine selected African countries. How-
ever, the estimated parameter of the external nance premium is statistically
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di¤erent from zero for all African countries. This suggests that the balance
sheet channel plays a signicant role in business cycle uctuations in African
economies. This is similar to the ndings by Elekdag et al. (2006) for South
Korea.
The presence of balance sheet channel dampens the expansionary e¤ects of
exchange rate depreciation in African economies. Exchange rate depreciation
increases the cost of debt service and deteriorates the net worth and balance
sheet of rms. Consequently, this increases the cost of capital, lowers invest-
ment and output. This is similar to the ndings by Céspedes (2006) and
Bebczuk et al. (2006). Furthermore, the balance sheet channel reduces the
e¤ect of monetary policy expansion on output. A monetary expansion re-
duces the interest rate and depreciates the exchange rate. The depreciation
of the exchange rate deteriorates the balance sheet of rms, reduces invest-
ment, contracts output and further exacerbates the external debt problem.
This largely reduces the potency of monetary policy in inuencing output.
As observed by Kramer and Thoenissen (2012), nancial frictions reduce the
e¤ectiveness of monetary policy.
These ndings pose a policy dilemma for monetary authorities in African
economies. If loose monetary policy is implemented, the low interest rate
reinforces the exchange rate depreciation thereby amplifying the output loss
(see Krugman, 1999b). Alternatively, if tight monetary policy is introduced,
the high interest rate strengthens the currency but contracts output. Cen-
tral to the ndings also is the appropriate exchange rate policy for African
countries when the balance sheet e¤ect is signicant. While Cook (2004)
recommends xed exchange rate regime when the balance sheet e¤ect mat-
ters, Céspedes et al. (2004) and Gertler et al. (2007) advocate for exible
exchange rate regime. Based on the balance sheet e¤ects of exchange rate de-
preciation, it will be prudent for African countries to manage their exchange
rate uctuations.
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In addition, African countries should reduce their exposure to foreign currency-
denominated debt. African countries should also deepen their domestic bond
markets. The deepening of domestic bond market will not only reduce their
exposure to foreign currency debts but also give African countries the policy
space to react to exogenous shocks.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Sovereign Wealth Funds and Macroeconomic Stability in African
Economies
Abstract
This paper investigates the e¤ectiveness of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in
reducing macroeconomic volatility in commodity exporting African countries.
We formulate and simulate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model that features sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). The simulation results
suggest that the creation of SWFs can reduce macroeconomic volatility in
commodity exporting countries. Particularly, SWFs can reduce government
expenditure, real exchange rate, and external debt volatility. Since these
are the channels through which commodity price shocks are transmitted to
the African economies, the creation of SWFs can reduce the macroeconomic
instability in African commodity exporting countries.
4.1. Introduction
Commodity exporting developing countries are quite vulnerable to commod-
ity price shocks. Sharp and unpredictable uctuations in commodity prices
induce exchange rate volatility (see Cashin et al. 2004; Dauvin, 2014) and
scal uncertainty and macroeconomic instability in commodity exporting
countries (see Medina, 2010; Spatafora and Samake, 2012). In view of the
developing countries limited and imperfect access to international capital
markets and the incompleteness of commodity-linked hedging market, the
establishment of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) is seen as the means of re-
ducing these exposures to commodity price risk. The creation of SWFs may
reduce income volatility, de-couple scal policy from revenue uncertainty,
prevent the occurrence of Dutch disease problem associated with commodity
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price boom, and promote macroeconomic stability (see Fasano, 2000; Shab-
sigh and Ilahi, 2007).
The gap that this study seek to ll is to investigate whether the creation
of SWFs in commodity exporting African countries can reduce the macro-
economic instability engendered by commodity price uctuations. There has
been limited empirical studies evaluating whether the creation of SWFs can
reduce economic volatility in African economies. Rather, the few existing em-
pirical studies on SWFs as scal and macroeconomic stabilization tools have
focused on oil exporting non-African countries (see Mehrara et al., 2012).
This study is signicant for policy-makers in commodity exporting African
countries. Given the strong positive correlation between commodity revenue
and government expenditure in commodity exporting African countries (see
Baunsgaard, 2003), the study will provide measures for the de-coupling of
scal operation from the volatile commodity revenue. Similarly, the study
will provide the mechanism for mitigating the e¤ect of export receipt inow
on money supply on the domestic economy. Raju and melo (2003) show that
co¤ee price shocks signicantly a¤ect money supply in Columbia. Lastly,
the study will also assist the policy-makers in the e¢ cient management of
commodity revenue.
This study contributes to the existing literature on sovereign wealth funds
(SWFs) in two respects. Firstly, we simulate our model to investigate whether
the creation of SWFs can reduce macroeconomic instability occasioned by
commodity price shocks in commodity exporting African countries. Sec-
ondly, we construct a DSGE model incorporating the sovereign wealth funds
for commodity exporting African countries.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the exist-
ing literature on commodity price shocks and macroeconomic uctuations.
Section 3 presents the stylised facts on commodity prices, scal balances and
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macroeconomic aggregates. Section 4 describes the model for the study. Sec-
tion 5 discusses the simulation results and summarises the ndings. The last
section draws conclusion and suggests policy implications.
4.2. Review of Literature
Empirical evidence on the impact of resource abundance on growth has been
quite inconclusive. A strand of literature, the resource curse hypothesis, ar-
gues that the availability of mineral resources promotes corruption, weakens
institution and reduces economic growth. For example, Sachs and Warner
(1999, 2001) nd that natural resource abundance reduces economic growth.
This occurs through the increase in the price of non-traded goods which
makes manufactured export uncompetitive. Similarly, Gylfason (2001) con-
cludes that resource abundance weakens the incentive to accumulate hu-
man capital and therefore lowers economic growth. Sala-i-Martin and Sub-
ramanian (2003) nd that resource abundance negatively impacts growth by
weakening the institutional quality. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) nd that
resource wealth promotes corruption, weakens institution, reduces the need
for savings and investment, and hence decreases economic growth.
In contrast, another strand of literature argues that resource abundance does
not retard but rather promote economic growth. For example, Alexeev and
Conrad (2004) nd that resource abundance promotes economic growth.
Similarly, Lederman and Maloney (2007) nd that it is not resource abun-
dance that hampers growth but export concentration. Brunnschweiler and
Bulte (2008), however, nd that resource abundance enhances better institu-
tion that positively promotes economic growth. They also nd that resource
dependence has no e¤ect on growth.
Resource abundance signicantly inuences scal operation in resource rich
countries. Thus, a number of authors have examined the impacts of com-
modity price shocks on scal outcome in commodity exporting countries.
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For instance, Medina (2010) shows that commodity price shocks exert strong
inuence on scal expenditure in commodity exporting Latin American coun-
tries. Kumah and Matovu (2007), Sturm et al. (2009), and Spatafora and
Samake (2012) nd that scal policy is highly procyclical in commodity-
exporting developing countries. This is attributed to the positive response of
expenditure to commodity prices. Evidence from oil producing countries also
indicates that government expenditure is pro-cyclical in oil exporting coun-
tries. Villafuerte and Lopez-Murphy (2010) and El Anshasy and Bradley
(2012) nd strong scal expansion during boom and scal tightening during
bust in oil exporting countries.
In addition, commodity price shocks have been found to a¤ect exchange
rate uctuations in commodity exporting countries. For example, Cashin
et al.(2004) nd that an increase in commodity price appreciates the real
exchange rate through a rise in wages in commodity exporting countries.
Arezki et al. (2012) show that gold price volatility induces real exchange
rate volatility in South Africa through capital inows. Löfgren et al. (2002)
and Bova (2009) nd comovement between cocoa price and exchange rate
in Cote dIvoire. Olomola and Adejumo (2006) and Iwayemi and Fowowe
(2012) report that oil price shocks inuence real exchange rate movements
in Nigeria.
Given the macroeconomic instability induced by commodity price shocks in
commodity exporting countries, di¤erent measures have been proposed to
cushion the impact of commodity price shocks on the domestic economy. A
number of studies emphasize the adoption of scal rules and strenghtening
of scal institutions to dampen macroeconomic volatility in commodity ex-
porting countries. For example, Baunsgaard (2003) and Frankel (2011) show
that scal rules and strenghtening of scal policy framework promote stabil-
ity in oil producing countries. Moreover, Schmidt-Hebbel (2012) nds that
scal rule has contributed to scal and macroeconomic stability in Chile. In
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contrast, Arezki and Ismail (2013) nd that scal rules have limited inuence
on government spending in oil producing countries.
Another strand of literature argues for the establishment of resource funds or
SWFs to mitigate the adverse e¤ect of commodity price swings in commodity
exporting countries. Fasano (2000) reviews the experience of resource funds
in six commodity exporting countries. The author nds that resource funds
have contributed to e¤ective management of scal policy in all the countries
except in Oman and Venezuela. Davis et al. (2001) nd that countries
with national revenue funds have lower expenditure volatility than countries
without national revenue funds. Ashafa (2007) concludes that resource funds
is an e¤ective scal stabilization tools when strong institution exists.
Similarly, Usui (2007) evaluates the e¤ectiveness of oil funds in Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan. The results indicate that oil funds have reduced scal
volatility in the two countries. Kalyuzhnova (2011) nds that national rev-
enue funds have been e¤ective in the management of scal balance in Kaza-
khstan. Everhart and Duval-Hernandez (2001) nd that oil funds smooth
consumption and reduce expenditure volatility in Mexico. Basu et al. (2013)
simulate the e¤ects of SWFs in Papua New Guinea. The simulation results
indicate that SWFs reduce macroeconomic volatility and enhance a stable
scal regime. In contrast, Devlin and Titman (2004) report that oil funds
have limited success on scal stability but are very useful for investment
strategy. Le Borgne and Medas (2007) nd that SWFs have not provided
scal stability in the Pacic Island.
The benets of resource funds have been found to extend beyond the scal
balances. For instance, Shabsigh and Ilahi (2007) and Mehrara et al. (2012)
investigate oil funds and macroeconomic stability in oil producing countries.
The results suggest that oil funds signicantly lower broad money, reduce
ination and mitigate macroeconomic volatility. Astrov (2007) nds that oil
funds sterilize exchange rate inows and decouple GDP growth rate from oil
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price dynamics in Russia. Park (2008), however, reports that SWFs has been
a major source of nancial instability in Asia.
Moreover, the establishment of sovereign wealth funds has been found to
reduce the negative e¤ects of reserve accumulation and improve governance
and institution. For example, Aizenman and Glick (2008) nd that sovereign
wealth funds reduce the opportunity costs of holding large reserves by the
central banks. Similarly, Arreaza et al. (2009) report that transfer of ex-
cess reserves to sovereign wealth funds reduce the cost of sterilization. On
institution and governance, Tsani (2013) nds that resource funds prevent
resource curse, improve governance and institutional quality in resource rich
countries. Ebert and La Menza (2015) concludes the creation of SWFs has
mitigated the Dutch-disease e¤ects in Chile.
4.3. Stylised Facts
High export concentration can generate remarkable instability in the econ-
omy of commodity exporting countries. Given the degree of export concen-
tration and commodity export dependence in Africa (see UNDP, 2012), com-
modity price uctuations markedly a¤ect the African economies. For exam-
ple, Bleaney and Greenaway (2001) nd that terms of trade instability neg-
atively a¤ect growth in Africa economies. Similarly, Addison and Ghoshray
(2013) nd that commodity price shocks have e¤ects on per capita income
in agricultural commodity exporting sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries.
Table 1 shows the volatility of some macroeconomic aggregates in African
commodity exporting countries.
The rst apparent property from the Table 1 is the high volatility of money
supply in all the countries. This might suggest non-sterilization of resource
revenue in African countries. The revenue from commodity export expands
the domestic money supply. This is similar to the ndings by Raju and Melo
(2003) in Columbia. The table also shows high volatility of revenue and ex-
penditure. This possibly reects procyclical scal policy in African countries
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This is related to the ndings by Erbil (2011) for oil producing developing
countries. Relative to other commodity exporting countries, output is more
volatile in oil exporting countries- Egypt, Nigeria and Tunisia. This suggests
that oil exporting countries are more vulnerable to oil price shocks than other
commodity exporting countries.
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Table 4.1: Business cycle properties
Country rgdp Re v Expdt RER MS 
Egypt
Mean 4.40 7.09 7.32 1.51 22.04 4.40
Min 3.94 6.85 7.01 1.36 20.01 3.50
Max 4.90 7.50 7.88 1.61 24.10 5.25
Kenya
Mean 4.29 21.74 21.85 4.39 22.21 3.62
Min 3.62 21.58 21.75 3.77 21.85 1.61
Max 4.82 21.82 21.94 4.61 22.66 5.41
Nigeria
Mean 25.18 9.94 9.53 4.52 23.81 2.67
Min 24.80 9.47 9.37 3.40 23.38 -0.42
Max 26.05 10.76 10.04 4.89 25.12 5.19
South Africa
Mean 4.38 21.70 21.82 1.86 22.62 3.88
Min 4.10 21.18 21.28 1.65 22.15 2.13
Max 4.84 22.42 22.55 2.03 23.56 5.04
Tunisia
Mean 4.40 18.34 18.30 0.18 18.94 4.47
Min 3.95 17.86 17.83 0.001 18.31 4.04
Max 4.85 18.88 18.89 0.26 19.68 4.84
 denotes standard deviation. All variables are logged and H-P ltered with
smoothing parameters 100. Rev is total revenue; expdt is total expenditure
rgdp is real gdp; ms is money supply; rer is real exchange rate; and 
is ination rate.
Table 2 presents the correlation between some macroeconomic aggregates.
Firstly, there is a strong correlation between revenue and expenditure in all
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the countries, implying pro-cyclical scal policy. This suggests that com-
modity exporting African countries increase expenditure when there is a rise
in commodity revenue and vice versa. This is in line with the ndings by
Spatafora and Samake (2012). Similarly, there is a positive correlation be-
tween commodity prices and scal expenditure in all the sample countries
except in Kenya. This indicates that government expenditure increases when
commodity price rises and declines when commodity price falls. This is re-
lated to the ndings by Kuma and Matovu (2007) and Kaminsky (2010). A
notable feature in table 2 is the high positive correlation between commod-
ity prices and government expenditure in the oil-exporting countries- Egypt,
Nigeria and Tunisia. This demonstrates that oil revenue signicantly a¤ects
scal balances in oil exporting countries.
Moreover, the correlation indicates that commodity price is positively related
to output in all the countries except in Kenya. This implies that a rise in
commodity price increases output while a fall in commodity price reduce out-
put in African countries. This is a form of symmetric relation which is similar
to the ndings by Addison and Ghoshray (2013). However, this is in contrast
to the Dehn (2000) who nd asymmetric impact of commodity price shocks
on economic growth in developing countries. In addition, the correlation
reveals a negative comovement between commodity prices and real exchange
rate for Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa. This shows that positive commod-
ity price shocks decrease (appreciate) the real exchange rate.This suggests
that these countries currencies are commodity currencies. This is similar
to the ndings by Frankel (2007) and Arezki et al. (2012) for commodity
exporting countries.
The correlations between commodity price and money supply are quite mixed.
The result shows a positive correlation between commodity prices and money
supply in Nigeria, South Africa, and Tunisia. This implies that a rise in com-
modity price increases domestic money supply, suggesting non-sterilization of
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the export revenue. However, the correlation is negative between commodity
prices and money supply in Egypt and Kenya. This denotes that commod-
ity revenues are sterilized in these two countries. Lastly, the table shows
that mixed correlation between commodity prices and ination in African
economies.
Table 4.2: Correlation between commodity prices and macroeconomic aggregates
Country rev;exp comp;exp comp;rgdp comp;rer comp;ms comp;
Egypt 1:00
(0:00)
0:98
(0:00)
0:89
(0:00)
 0:16
(0:49)
 0:88
(0:00)
0:25
(0:27)
Kenya 0:83
(0:00)
 0:78
(0:00)
 0:91
(0:00)
0:04
(0:81)
 0:79
(0:07)
0:06
(0:73)
Nigeria 0:90
(0:00)
0:76
(0:00)
0:38
(0:03)
 0:45
(0:01)
0:75
(0:00)
 0:41
(0:02)
South Africa 0:99
(0:01)
0:43
(0:01)
0:57
(0:00)
 0:16
(0:39)
0:64
(0:00)
 0:19
(0:31)
Tunisia 1:00
(0:00)
0:94
(0:00)
0:89
(0:00)
0:67
(0:00)
0:93
(0:00)
 0:12
(0:61)
 denotes correlation; rev is revenue; exp is expenditure; comp is
commodity price;rer is real exchange rate; and ms is money supply
All variables are logged and H-P ltered with smoothing parameter 100.
4.4. The Model
4.4.1 Households
We employ a DSGE model with non-separable money similar to the one in
Andrés et al. (2006). Given the importance of foreign currency holdings
by African households as noted by Elkhaf (2002) and Adom et al. (2008),
we assume that households allocate their real holdings between domestic
and foreign currencies. For simplicity, we assume this allocation to be in
xed proportions, so that StMt = %Mt, where St is the nominal exchange
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rate, Mt is foreign nominal money and Mt is domestic nominal money. The
householdspreferences are given by:
Ut =
1X
t=0
t
1
1  
"
Ct
Cht 1
1  
1 +
%
St

Mt
Pt
#
  N
1+ 
t
1 +  
(1)
where Ct, Pt and Nt represent aggregate consumption, domestic price level
and labour respectively. The parameter h measures the degree of habit for-
mation consumption. The parameter  is the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient
;   (0; 1) is the discount factor;  is the inverse of the Frisch labour supply
elasticity and  represents interest rate elasticity of money demand.
Households hold their wealth in the form of foreign and domestic currency
and domestic bonds. Furthermore households borrow from foreign capital
markets. Therefore the budget constraint is:
Ct +

1 +
%
St

Mt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
  StD

t
Pt
=
WtNt
Pt
+
Bt 1
Pt
(1 + rt 1)
+

1 +
%
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
Mt 1
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(2)
 StD

t 1
Pt
 
1 + rdt 1

where Dt is the level of foreign debt, Wt is the nominal wage rate, rt is the
domestic nominal interest rate and rdt is the interest rate on foreign debt.
Households enter period t with domestic money holdings Mt, bonds Bt, and
foreign debt Dt :
Households choose the path of Ct;Mt; Bt; and Nt that maximize expected
utility. The rst order conditions are:
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where equations (3)(7) denote the derivatives of the utility function to its
arguments.
Our consumption Euler equation is:
ect = h (   1)
c
ect 1 + 
c
Etect+1 + 
c
emt   
c
Et emt+1
  %
s0c
est + %
s0c
Etest+1   1
c
(ert   Etet+1) (8)
whereedenotes percentage deviation from the steady state and c =  +
h (   1). As in Castelnuovo (2012), eq.(8) shows that consumption depends
on the weighted average of past and expected future consumption, real inter-
est rate, and real balances. Furthermore, to the extent that households hold
domestic currency, a depreciation of the current exchange rate reduces house-
hold wealth, which reduces aggregate consumption. Through this channel,
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the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate may generate a contractionary
e¤ect on output as pointed out by Edwards (1986).
In order to express the IS curve in terms of output, we rst write the macro-
balance equation:
eyt = cect + xext   zezt + gegt + "g;t (9)
where eyt is the percentage deviation of output from the steady state; ext per-
centage deviations of exports, ezt is the percentage deviation of imports andegt is the deviation of government expenditure from the steady state. The pa-
rameter j is the steady state ratio of variable j to output, "g;t is a demand
shock that combines government expenditure and investment shocks. We
follow McCallum and Nelson (2000) in formulating our net export function
as:
fnxt = yfeyft   yeyt + rfrert (10)
where eyft , yf , y, and r, are the foreign output, elasticity of net export to
foreign output, the elasticity of net export to domestic output, and sum of
elasticity of substitution in production for home and abroad respectively .
The real exchange rate is dened as frert  est + ept   ept: Substituting eq.(10)
into eq.(9) yields the expression:
ect = 1
c
 
1 + y
 eyt   r
c
frert   yf
c
eyft   gc egt (11)
Substituting eq.(11) into eq.(9) yields the output-based IS equation:
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We assume that the innovation "yt follows a rst-order autoregressive process
as "at = a"
a
t 1 + 
a
t . Output depends positively on the real exchange rate
and foreign output. As a departure from McCallum and Nelson (2000), our
dynamic IS equation also features output as a function of lags and leads of
the real exchange rate, foreign output and government expenditure.
4.4.2 Firms
In line with Batini et al. (2005) and Malikane (2014), we assume that nal
goods producing rms exhibit non-linear input requirement in the production
function such that Xi;t = Y
i
t where Xi;t is the amount of non-labour input
i required in production, Yt is output, and i > 0 is the elasticity of the
input requirement with respect to changes in output. Labour and non-labour
inputs are complements as in Smets and Wouters (2002). The production
function is given as:
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Yt = AtN

t
"
nY
i=1
Y iit
#
(13)
where at denotes productivity shocks, Nt is the level of employment, i is
the elasticity of output with respect to input i and 0 <  < 1 . The reduced
form of eq.(13) is:
Yt = A
0
tN

t (14)
where  =
nX
i=1
ii;  =

1  , and A
0
t =A
1
1 
t . The productivity shock is
assumed to follow a rst order autoregressive process: At = A
A
t 1e
"pt . Using
eq.(14), total real cost is:
TCt =
WtY
1

t
A
0
1

t Pt
+
nX
i=1
Pit
Pt
Y it ; (15)
where Pit is the price of non-labour input i , Pt is the aggregate price level
while Wt denotes the nominal wages. Let pit be the real price of the non-
labour input, the real marginal cost can be specied as:
MCt =
WtY
1 

t
A
0 1

t Pt
+
nX
i=1
ipitY
i 1
t (16)
whereMCt represents the marginal cost. We follow Galí and Gertler (1999)
and formulate the hybrid new Keynesian Phillips curve as follows:
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et = fEtet+1 + bet 1 + fmct; (17)
where:
f  f + ! [1   (1  )]g 1;  (1  ) (1  ) (1  !) 
b  !f + ! [1   (1  )]g 1;  
(1  )
1 +  ("  1)f + ! [1   (1  )]g
 1;
 is measures price stickiness, ! is the degree of price indexation, " is the
goodselasticity of substitution. We linearize eq.(16) and substitute eq.(5)
and eq.(11) to derive the marginal cost written as:
fmct = #aeyt   #beyt 1   #c emt + #dest   #efrert
+#f frert 1   #geyft + #heyft 1 + #iepit   #jeat; (18)
where:
108
#a =
 
ls
 
1 + y

c (1 +  )
+
ls

  ls
(1 +  )
+
nX
i=1
i
piox0
y0
!
;
#b =
lsh (   1)
 
1 + y

c(+  )
;#c =
ls
(1 +  )
;#d =
ls%
s0(1 +  )
#e =
lsr
c(1 +  )
;#f =
lsh (   1) r
c(1 +  )
(1  ) ls

#g =
lsyf
c(1 +  )
;#h =
lsh (   1) yf
c(1 +  )
;#i =
nX
i=1
i
piox0
y0
#j =
ls

; ls = y0a
 1
0 n
 1
0
4.4.3 The sovereign wealth funds
Similar to Basu et al. (2013), we develop a link between sovereign wealth
funds and commodity windfall. We assume that the government adopts a
scal stance where a constant share of the commodity windfall  q is saved
in the SWFs. The commodity windfall is (q   qa) where q is the commodity
spot price and qa is the average price. The accumulation of funds in SWFs
depends on the deviation of commodity spot price from its average. The
SWFs equation evolves according to:
ft =

1 + rft 1

ft 1 +  q (qst   qat ) (19)
where ft is the SWFs and r
f
t is the interest rate on the existing SWFs.
4.4.4 The government
The government nances its expenditure by issuing one-period domestic bond
denoted by Bt, by foreign debt Dt , and through the tax revenue denoted by
Tt . Both the government and the private hold some foreign debt. The
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fraction of government budget decit nanced through foreign borrowing is
(1  m). The government expenditure consist of spending for the provision
of public goods Gt, interest payments on domestic currency debts rt, and
interest payments on foreign currency-denominated debt rft . The proportion
of the government nanced from the commodity windfall is(1   q) (qt   qat ).
In real terms, the government budget constraint is:
bt + (1  m) dt = (gt   tt) + (1 + rt 1) bt 1   (1   q) (qt   qat )
+ (1  m)

1 + rft 1

dt 1 (20)
where (gt   tt) is the government budget decit.
4.4.5 Exchange rate and external debt
The interest rate on foreign debt is made up of the foreign risk-free rate and
the risk premium. We assume that rdt = r
f
t  !qeqt+!d edt !f eft . This implies
that the sovereign risk premium is driven positively by the burden of external
debt, which increases the risk of default and negatively by commodity prices
and SWFs, which increase the dollar liquidity of the commodity-exporting
country. In our formulation, a positive shock to the foreign risk-free interest
rate increases the countrys interest rate spread and the cost of borrowing
(see Uribe and Yue, 2006). In contrast, positive shocks to commodity prices
reduce the spread and cost of borrowing for commodity exporting countries
(see Senhadji, 2003; Muhanji and Ojah, 2011). Combining Eqs.(6) and (7),
we can therefore write the UIP expression as follows:
est = Etest+1   (ert   erft )  !qeqt + !d edt   !f eft + "dt (21)
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where est is the nominal exchange rate, (ert   erft ) is the interest rate di¤er-
ential, eqt is the commodity price and edt is external debt to GDP ratio, andeft is the sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). The coe¢ cients !q, !d, and !f
represent the sensitivity of the sovereign risk premium with respect to the
commodity price, external debt, and SWFs respectively. As noted by García
and González (2013), a higher risk premium induces capital outow and de-
preciates the exchange rate. Moreover, the exchange rate depends negatively
on commodity prices and positively on external debt to GDP ratio, as shown
by Cashin et al.(2004).
The dynamics of external debt depends on the current account balance of the
private sector, foreign debt service payment, budget decit, and on the share
of the windfall that is available to nance scal decit. Thus, the external
debt to GDP ratio evolves according to the following equation:
Dt
PtYt
=
Zt  Xt
Yt
+
 
1 + rdt 1

dt 1 + (1  m)

Gt   Tt
Yt
  (1   q) (q   qa)

(22)
where D

t
PtYt
is the ratio of external debt to GDP, Zt Xt
Yt
represents the current
account balance by the private sector and rdt is the interest rate on external
debt. The change in the debt ratio over time can then be written as:
dt = (zt   xt) + dt 1
 
1 + rdt 1   t 1  yt 1

(23)
+(1  m) (gt   tt   (1   q) (q   qa))
Eq.(23) shows that the change in the external debt ratio is a positive function
of net import and foreign interest rate. For example, a rise in net imports
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is nanced by borrowing which increases the level of debt. Similarly, an
increase in interest rate on external debt increases the debt service payment
and therefore puts upward pressure on the debt ratio. We linearize Eq.(23)
and substitute Eq.(10) to derive the equation for the dynamics of the external
debt ratio. Note that from Eq.(21) we have rdt = r
f
t   !qeqt + !d edt   !f eft
and we substitute (zt   xt) = fnxt = yfeyft   yeyt + rfrert. Using this fact,
we have the debt equation as follows:
edt = a edt 1+berft  ceyt deyt eeqt f frert geyft  (1   q) (q   qa)+"et
(24)
where
d = (1 + g0)
2   r0!d; a =
(1 + g0) + r0
d
; b =
r0
d
;
c =
(1 + g0) y
dd

0
; d =
r0 + (1 + g0)
3
(1 + g0)
; e =
r0!q
d
;
f =
(1 + g0) r
dd

0
; g =
(1 + g0) yf
dd

0
; "et = e"
e
t 1 + 
e
t
Eq. (24) describes the external debt evolution where g0, is the steady state
growth rate, r0, is the steady state interest rate, and d0 is steady state debt-
GDP ratio. There is a negative relation between external debt and com-
modity prices. In addition, external debt to GDP depends negatively on
domestic output and positively on foreign output. Lastly, external debt to
GDP depends positively on foreign interest rate and real exchange rate.
4.4.6 Monetary policy
We equate Eqs. (4) and (6) and linearize to derive the money market equa-
tion. We substitute Eqs.(10) and (11) and the money market equation is
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given as:
ert = aeyt   b emt + cest   %Etest+1   dfrert   eeyft + "bt (25)
where
"rt = b"
r
t 1 + 
b
t ; a =
r
 
1 + y

mc
; b =
r
m
; c =
%
s0
r;
d =
rr
mc
; e =
ryf
mc
Eq.(25) describes the money market equation. The interest rate depends pos-
itively on real output and negatively on real balances. The interest rate also
depends positively on current exchange rate and negatively on expected fu-
ture exchange rate. Lastly, interest rate depends negatively on real exchange
rate and foreign output.
Given monetary aggregate targeting in Africa, we follow Muhanji and Ojah
(2011) in the specication of our monetary policy reaction function. Money
supply is driven by ination gap and output gap and commodity prices gap.
We include the real exchange rate and sovereign wealth funds in our money-
type Taylor rule. The monetary aggregate is:
emt = m emt 1   (1  m)[et 1 + yeyt 1 + rerfrert 1 + qeqt 1   !f eft 1]
+"mt (26)
where all variables are in the steady states. emt is monetary aggregate, et
is ination rate gap; eyt is output gap; frert is real exchange rate gap, eqt is
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commodity price gap and ef is the sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). Commod-
ity revenue a¤ects money supply in African countries. Hence, we introduce
the SWFs in the monetary policy rule to evaluate policy reaction when the
SWFs takes part of the revenue. The disturbance follows an AR(1) process:
"mt = c"
m
t 1 + 
c
t . The parameters m is policy rate smoothing,  is policy
reaction to ination gap, y is policy reaction to output gap, rer is policy
reaction to real exchange rate gap, and q is policy reaction to commodity
price gap, and !f is the policy reaction to the sovereign wealth funds. The
structural shock processes in the model are given by the following vector:
et =  et + ";t; ";t  N  0; 2 (27)
where
";t =
heqt; erft ; eyft ; epit; et; frerti
4.5. Calibration
Table 3 shows the calibration for the study. The calibration for the habit
parameter h, price stickiness parameter , price indexation parameter !, and
good elasticity of substitution " comes from Castelnuovo (2012). The cali-
bration of , , and  , comes from Smets and Wouters (2007). Similarly, the
calibration for monetary policy reaction coe¢ cient to output
 
y

, ination
(), and monetary smoothing parameter (m) is from Smets and Wouters
(2007). The calibration for the inverse elasticity of money holding  is in line
with Benchimol and Fourçans (2012). The parameter for currency substitu-
tion is calibrated along the line of Elkhaf (2002). The calibration for policy
reaction to exchange rate (rer) comes from García and González (2013). We
assume the same value for reaction to commodity price shocks.
Moreover, the calibration of the discount factor  follows the standard in the
literature (see Steinbach et al., 2009). The calibration of the sum of elasticity
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of home and foreign production r is from McCallum and Nelson (2000). Our
calibration for y, yf , and c follows Lombardo and McAdam (2012),. In
line with Batini et al. (2005), we assume that input requirements per unit
of output is increasing at the margin because rms tend to use less e¢ cient
machines as output rises, we therefore set i = 2. We assume that the steady
state share of intermediate input costs in total output pi0x0y 10 = 0:5. This is
a reasonable calibration for African economies, given the evidence by Eifert
et al.(2008).
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Table 4.3: Calibrated parameter
Description Parameter Value
Habit formation h 0:70
Elasticity of money holding  1:25
Intertemporal elasticity of substitutionn  1:50
Capital share in production  0:33
Inv. of Frisch labour elasticity  2:00
Elasticity of currency substitution % 0:30
Goods elasticity of substitution " 6:00
Discount factor  0:99
Price stickiness  0:65
Price indexation ! 0:50
Elasticity of risk premium to external debt !d 0:50
Elasticity of risk premium to commodity price !q 0:20
Policy response to output y 0:12
Policy response to ination  1:50
Policy rate smoothing mag 0:75
Policy response to real exchange rate rer 0:50
Policy response to commodity price q 0:50
Sum of elast. of subst. for home and foreign prod. r 0:66
Elasticity of net export to domestic output y 0:20
Elasticity of net export to foreign output yf 0:20
Steady state ratio of consumption to output c 0:58
Steady state ratio of gov. expenditure to output g 0:25
Share of budget decit nanced by foreign debt m 0:5
4.6. Simulations
We simulate our baseline model based on the calibrated values for our para-
meters in table 1. To investigate the e¤ectiveness of sovereign wealth funds
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(SWFs) in reducing macroeconomic instability, we simulate our model with
SWFs under di¤erent values for ( q) that goes into the SWFs account. Our
hypothetical value of  q - the share of the windfall that goes into the funds is
0.5 . Generally, our simulation shows that the creation of SWFs can reduce
the macroeconomic volatility associated with commodity price uctuations.
4.6.1 Commodity price shock
Fig. 1 illustrates the responses of selected macroeconomic variables to a
positive commodity price shock under the baseline model (model without
SWFs) and the model with sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). Generally, the
simulation results indicate that SWFs can reduce the volatility of macro-
economic variables in commodity exporting countries. There is stability in
all the macroeconomic variables following a positive commodity price shock.
For example, the volatility in government expenditure is lower under the
SWFs model compared to the baseline model. This indicates that SWFs
can be used to reduce expenditure volatility in commodity exporting African
countries.
The SWFs prevent the total injection of windfall into the domestic economy
thereby insulating the economy from the inow of commodity revenue. This
is in line with the ndings by Everhart and Duval-Hernandez (2001) for Mex-
ico. Since scal policy is the main channel through which commodity price
shocks are transmitted to the domestic economy (see Spatafora and Samake,
2012), SWFs can reduce the macroeconomic instability in commodity ex-
porting African countries.
In addition, the simulation result indicates that the SWFs are e¤ective in
reducing external debt and the real exchange rate volatility in commodity
exporting countries. Under the baseline model, external debt seems to be
more volatile after a positive commodity price shock. The introduction of
SWFs reduces the volatility of external debt. Since part of the windfall is
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channeled to the SWFs, this prevents using the whole revenue to pay the
for all the debt. Moreover, the real exchange rate remains stable under the
SWFs model after a rise in commodity price. The SWFs absorb the com-
modity revenue that could cause real exchange rate appreciation. Through
this channel, SWFs can prevent the occurrence of the Dutch disease problem.
This suggests that the creation of SWFs can mitigate the adverse e¤ects of
commodity price uctuations in commodity exporting countries.
Furthermore, the simulation results suggest that the introduction of SWFs
can stabilize output volatility arising from commodity price shocks. This
might be through the e¤ects of SWFs on the exchange rate. While exchange
rate appreciation occurs under the baseline and the SWFs model, the appre-
ciation is small under the SWFs model. The minimal size of appreciation
under the SWFs model prevents output volatility. Moreover, the introduc-
tion of the SWFs reduces the volatility of money supply. By directing part
of the commodity windfall into the SWFs, the government reduces the ef-
fect of commodity revenue on the monetary base. This indicates that SWFs
can be used as a tool of sterilization in African countries. This is similar to
the conclusion by Astrov (2007) for Russia. Similarly, the simulation result
suggests that ination is stable under the model with SWFs.
Fig. 3.1. Responses of macroeconomic variables to positive commodity price shocks
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The simulation result in g. 3.1 is however sensitive to the choice of calibrated
value for the elasticity of sovereign risk premium (!q) to commodity prices.
When this elasticity is high (!q > 0:4), the e¤ectiveness of SWFs in insulating
the economy from external shocks is weakened. This indicates that if the
sovereign risk premium for commodity exporters is high, SWFs impact may
be weakened.
4.7. Conclusion
African countries derive their export revenues from the export of a narrow
range of primary commodities. This exposes the African economies to uctu-
ations in commodity prices. Moreover, scal operations in African countries
strongly correlate with commodity prices, hence commodity price volatility
is directly translated to scal uncertainty. The scal policy volatility gen-
erates macroeconomic instability in commodity exporting African countries.
In this paper, we formulate an open economy DSGE model with sovereign
wealth funds (SWFs) to investigate the e¤ectiveness of SWFs in reducing
macroeconomic instability in commodity exporting African countries.
We simulate the model for two di¤erent scenarios- a baseline model without
the SWFs and a model with SWFs. The simulation results indicate that
the creation of SWFs can insulate the African economies from commodity
price shocks. The creation of SWFs can reduce expenditure volatility in
commodity exporting African countries. Given the fact that the government
expenditure is an important channel through which the e¤ects of commodity
price shocks are transmitted to African economies, the creation of SWFs
might protect the African economies against volatile commodity prices. This
is similar to the results by Shabsigh and Ilahi (2007). Moreover, through
the SWFs impact on scal balances, the resource curse syndrome may be
reversed in African economies.
In addition, we nd that the creation of sovereign wealth funds can stabi-
lize external debt, real exchange rate, money supply, and output of African
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countries. SWFs may stabilize the external debt following a commodity price
shocks. Similarly, our simulation results suggest that SWFs can insulate the
exchange rate from commodity price shocks. This can serve as a mechanism
for preventing the Dutch disease problem associated with commodity price
boom in African economies. Also, we nd that the introduction of SWFs
lowers the volatility of output and money supply. This serves to prevent the
macroeconomic distortion caused by inow of commodity revenue.
In view of the results on the e¤ectiveness of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)
on scal expenditure, policy makers in African countries should set up SWFs
to insulate the economy from the vulnerability to external shocks. Empirical
ndings have shown that African countries are vulnerable to external shocks
(see Kose and Riezman, 2001). Moreover, SWFs should also be created
in African countries to prevent the resource curse problem. Furthermore,
African countries should establish SWFs to sterilize the inow of commodity
revenue during the period of commodity price boom.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusion and Policy Implications
5.1 Introduction
This thesis has 3 objectives. Firstly, we investigate the relative contributions
of internal and external shocks to macroeconomic uctuations in ten African
economies. Secondly, we evaluate the quantitative signicance of the balance
sheet channel in African economies. Thirdly, we assess the e¤ectiveness of
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in ensuring scal and macroeconomic stability
in commodity exporting African countries.
5.2 Sources of macroeconomic uctuations in Africa
In chapter 2, we investigate the sources of macroeconomic uctuations in ten
(10) African countries over 1990-2011. We consider eleven macroeconomic
shocks that are considered empirically important for the African economies.
We formulate and estimate an open economy monetary dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) model. We build on the work of Kose and
Riezman (2001) . We employ the Bayesian technique to estimate our model.
We also employ variance error decomposition to show the contribution of each
shocks to economic uctuations and impulse response function to illustrate
the dynamic response of output to di¤erent shocks.
We nd that both internal and external shocks account for output uctua-
tions in African economies. The e¤ects of internal shocks are short-lived; they
last up till the 4th quarter. The most important internal shocks inuencing
output in African economies are productivity and money supply shocks. In
contrast, external shocks have long-lasting impacts on African economies.
Their e¤ects range from the 8th to 16 quarters. Among the external shocks,
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external debts, foreign interest rate, foreign input price, exchange rate and
commodity price shocks are found to account for large output uctuations
in African economies.
The dominant e¤ects of external shocks might be attributed to the depen-
dence of many African countries on the export of primary commodities for
their export earnings. Given the volatility of the commodity prices and pro-
cyclical scal stance of African countries, negative commodity price shocks
induce scal decits which are nanced by external borrowing. Consequently,
a positive shock to world interest rate aggravate the debt problem as the cost
of servicing debt increases. The rising debt service cost reduces capital ex-
penditure, public investment and economic growth. We recommend that
African countries need to diversify the economies from the dependence on
export of primary commodities. We recommend the diversication of the
economy and creation of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) to cushion the ef-
fects of commodity price uctuations.
5.3. The balance sheet channel in African economies
In chapter 3, we evaluate the role played by nancial market imperfections
in the propagation and amplication of relatively small shocks to the real
economy in nine (9) African countries. We formulate and estimate an open
economy monetary DSGE model with nancial market imperfection. In the
model, entrepreneur net worth determines the cost of borrowing. The higher
the entrepreneur net worth, the lower the cost of borrowing and vice versa.
In a manner similar to Elekdag et al. (2006), we estimate our model with
Bayesian technique. Also, similar to Castelnuovo (2012), we compare the
model with and without nancial imperfections.
Our results suggest that the balance sheet channel is quantitatively important
for African economies. The presence of the balance sheet channel dampens
the expansionary e¤ects of exchange rate on output in African countries.
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Following exchange rate depreciation, output contracts rather than expands
as in the traditional Mundel-Fleming hypothesis. In many countries, output
tends to negative following exchange rate depreciations. This can be at-
tributed to the balance sheet e¤ects. When debts are held in foreign denom-
inated currencies, exchange rate depreciation increases the domestic value of
debt and deteriorates the countrys balance sheet. The worsening of balance
sheet increases the cost of capital, lower investment and output. We also
nd evidence of J-curve e¤ects under the model without nancial imperfec-
tion. Following exchange rate depreciation, output initially contracts but
later expands in the medium to long run.
5.4 Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and macroeconomic stability
In chapter 4, we investigate whether the establishment of SWFs can reduce
macroeconomic instability in commodity exporting African countries. We
formulate and simulate a DSGEmodel incorporated with the scal sector and
sovereign wealth funds. Our simulation results suggest that sovereign wealth
funds reduce scal volatility in commodity exporting countries. Through
SWFs impacts on scal outcomes, macroeconomic instability in commodity
exporting countries can be reduced. This arises from the fact that scal op-
erations serve as the main channel through which the impacts of commodity
prices are transmitted to the economies of commodity exporting countries
(see, e.g., Medina, 2010; El Anshasy and Bradley, 2012).
5.5 Policy implications and recommendations of the study
The results of the study have important policy implications for African
economies. In view of the vulnerability of African economies to external
shocks, it is imperative that African countries formulate policies such as
sound external debt management and hedging strategies to insulate or mit-
igate the e¤ects of external shocks . Since many of these economies rely
heavily on very few, if not one, commodities for foreign exchange earnings,
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it is necessary that these countries pursue policies that promote industrial
diversication. Another way in which African countries can create a bu¤er
against adverse external shocks is to set up sovereign wealth funds (SWFs).
These funds can be used to reduce macroeconomic volatility arising from
commodity price boom-bust cycles. Establishment of SWFs with transpar-
ent rules of operation can be used to support balanced scal positions and
promote macroeconomic stability.
The ndings pose a policy dilemma for monetary authorities in African
economies. If loose monetary policy is implemented, the low interest rate
reinforces the exchange rate depreciation thereby amplifying the output loss.
Alternatively, if tight monetary policy is introduced, the high interest rate
strengthens the currency but contracts output. Tight monetary policy seems
to be the optimal response in the face of balance sheet e¤ects. Important
policy recommendations for African countries is the reduction in their expo-
sure to foreign currency debts and deepening of the domestic bond markets.
The deepening of domestic bond market will not only reduce their exposure
to foreign currency debts but also give African countries the policy space to
react to exogenous shocks.
Moreover, the simulation results suggest that SWFs reduce volatility in scal
spending in commodity exporting countries. Fiscal spending is the main
channel through which macroeconomic e¤ects of commodity price shocks
are transmitted to the domestic economy. Hence, SWFs might promote
macroeconomic stability in commodity exporting African countries.
5.6 Suggested areas for further research
Further studies should include scal policy shocks among shocks a¤ecting
African economies. Furthermore, other studies should also compare scal
rules and SWFs in the promotion of macroeconomic stability in commodity
exporting African countries.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix to Chapter One
A. 1. The households preference is:
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rst order conditions are :
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A.1. 1 Derivation of the IS equation
Equate (4A) and (7A)
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Re-write Eq. (9A) as
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Linearize Eq. (10A)
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emt    %
s0
est   emt+1
+
%
s0
est+1   (rt   Et+1) (14A)
Let
ect = h (   1)
( + h (   1))ect 1 + ( + h (   1))ect+1 + ( + h (   1)) emt
  %
s0

( + h (   1))est   ( + h (   1)) emt+1 + %s0 ( + h (   1))est+1
  1
( + h (   1)) (rt   Et+1) (15A)
Market equilibrium
Yt = Ct + It +Gt +Xt   Zt
Assuming investment and government are exogenous, we re-write the market
equilibrium:
eyt = cect + xext   mezt (16A)
ect = 1
c
eyt   x
c
ext + z
c
ezt
Substitute Eq. (17A) in Eq. (15A)
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1c
eyt   x
c
ext + z
c
ezt = h (   1)
( + h (   1))

1
c
eyt 1   x
c
ext 1 + z
c
ezt 1
+

( + h (   1))

1
c
eyt+1   x
c
ext+1 + z
c
ezt+1
+

( + h (   1)) emt   %s0 ( + h (   1))est (18A)
  
( + h (   1)) emt+1 + %s0 ( + h (   1))est+1
  1
( + h (   1)) (rt   Et+1)
1
c
eyt = h (   1)
( + h (   1))

1
c
eyt 1   x
c
ext 1 + z
c
ezt 1
+

( + h (   1))

1
c
eyt+1   x
c
ext+1 + z
c
ezt+1
+

( + h (   1)) emt   s( + h (   1))est
  
( + h (   1)) emt+1 + s( + h (   1))est+1 (19A)
  1
( + h (   1)) (rt   Et+1) +
x
c
ext   z
c
ezt
eyt = h (   1)
( + h (   1))eyt 1   xh (   1)( + h (   1))ext 1 + zh (   1)( + h (   1))ezt 1
+

( + h (   1))eyt+1   x( + h (   1))ext+1 + z( + h (   1))ezt+1
+
c
( + h (   1)) emt   %s0 c( + h (   1))est   c( + h (   1)) emt+1
+
%
s0
c
( + h (   1))est+1   c( + h (   1)) (rt   Et+1) + xext   zezt(20A)
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eyt = h (   1)
( + h (   1))eyt 1 + ( + h (   1))eyt+1   c( + h (   1)) (rt   Et+1)
+
c
( + h (   1)) emt   c( + h (   1)) emt+1   %s0 c( + h (   1))est
+
%
s0
c
( + h (   1))est+1   h (   1)( + h (   1)) (xext 1   zezt 1) (21A)
  
( + h (   1)) (xext+1   zezt+1) + xext   zezt
Similar to McCallum and Nelson (2001), net export is dened as:
xext   zezt = rgrert   yeyt + yfeyft (22A)
Let c = ( + h (   1)). Substitute Eq. (22A) in Eq. (21A) to derive an
open economy IS equation:
eyt = h (   1)
c
eyt 1 + 
c
Eteyt+1   c
c
 
1 + y
 (ert   Etet+1)
+
c
c
 
1 + y
 emt   c
c
 
1 + y
Et emt+1   %c
s0c
 
1 + y
est
+
%c
s0c
 
1 + y
Etest+1   h (   1) r
c
 
1 + y
 frert 1
+
r 
1 + y
 frert   r
c
 
1 + y
Etfrert+1   h (   1) yf
c
 
1 + y
 eyft 1
+
yf 
1 + y
eyft   yf
c
 
1 + y
Eteyft+1 + "at (23A)
A.2. Derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
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Equate (4A) and (6A)
N t
Pt
Wt
=
1
Cht 1

Ct
Cht 1
  
1 +
%
St

Mt
Pt

(1B)
Linearize Eq. (1B)
 
n0
w0
ent   n0
w0
ewt = 1 + %
s0

m0

(h   )ect 1   ect    %
s0
est + emt
(2B)
 
n0
w0
ent   n0
w0
ewt = n0
w0

(h   )ect 1   ect    %
s0
est + emt
 
n0
w0
ent = n0
w0
ewt + n0
w0

(h   )ect 1   ect    %
s0
est + emt
 ent = ewt + (h   )ect 1   ect    %
s0
est + emt
ent = 1
 
ewt +  (h  1)
 
ect 1   
 
ect   %
s0 
est + 
 
emt (3B)
Given a production function
Yt = AtNt
"
nY
i=1
Y iit
#
(4B)
The reduced form is
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Yt = A
0
tN

t (5B)
The total cost is:
TCt =
WtY
1

t
A
0 1

t Pt
+
nX
i=1
Pi;t
Pt
Y it (6B)
The marginal cost is:
MCt =
WtY
1 

t
A
0 1

t Pt
+
nX
i=1
ipitY
i 1
t (7B)
Recall that Nt =

Yt
A0t
 1

:The marginal cost can be re-written as:
MCt =
wtNt
Yt
+
nX
i=1
ipitY
i 1
t (8B)
Linearize Eq. (8B)
fmct = w0n0
mc0y0
( ewt + ent + eyt) + 1
mc0
X
ipi0 (i   1) y0eyt + 1
mc0
X
iy0pi0epit
(9B)
Recall that wt =MPL =  (yt   nt)
fmct = w0n0
mc0y0
[(1  ) ent   (1  ) eyt] + 1
mc0
X
ipi0 (i   1) y0eyt
+
1
mc0
X
iy0pi0epit + 1
mc0
eat (10B)
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Recall that
ect =  1 + y
c
eyt   r
c
frert + yf
c
eyft (11B)
Substitute Eq. (11B) in Eq. (3B)
ent = 
 
(eyt   ent) +  (h  1)
 
" 
1 + y

c
eyt 1   r
c
frert 1 + yf
c
eyft 1
#
 
 
" 
1 + y

c
eyt   r
c
frert + yf
c
eyft
#
  %
s0 
est + 
 
emt (12B)
ent = (1  )
( + (1  ))eyt + h (   1)
 
1 + y

c ( + (1  ))
eyt 1   rh (   1)
c ( + (1  ))
frert 1
  yfh (   1)
c ( + (1  ))
eyft 1     1 + yc ( + (1  ))eyt + rc ( + (1  ))frert
+
yf
c ( + (1  ))
eyft + ( + (1  )) emt   %s0 ( + (1  ))est (13B)
Substitute Eq. (13B) in Eq. (10B) yields:
fmct =  ls  1 + y
c (1 +  )
+
ls

  ls
(1 +  )
+
nX
i=1
i
pi0x0
y
!eyt   lsh (   1)  1 + y
c (+  )
eyt 1
  ls
(1 +  )
emt + ls%
s0 (1 +  )
est   lsr
c (1 +  )
frert + rlsh (   1)
c (+  )
(1  ) ls

frert 1
  lsyf
c (1 +  )
eyft + lsh (   1) yfc (+  ) eyft 1 +
nX
i=1
i
pi0x0
y
epit   ls

eat
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where
ls =
y0
a0n0
The new Keynesian Phillips curve:
et = fEtet+1 + bet 1 + fmct (14B)
A.3. Derivation of Debt equation
Dt
YT
=
Zt  Xt
Yt
+ rdt
Dt 1
Yt
(1C)
Di¤erentiate with respect to time
dt = (dt   dt 1) = (zt   xt) + rdt (1 + yt) 1 dt 1  ytdt (2C)
dt +ytdt =   (xt   zt) + rdt (1 + yt) 1 dt 1 + dt 1
(xt   zt) = rrer   yyt + yfyft
dt +ytdt =  

rrer   yyt + yfyft

+ rdt (1 + yt)
 1 dt 1 + dt 1
(1 + yt) dt = dt 1 + rdt (1 + yt)
 1 + yyt   rrer   yfyft (3C)
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Linearize Eq. (3C)
d0 (1 + g0) edt + d0 (1 + g0)eyt = d0 edt 1 + r0d0 (1 + g0) 1 erdt
+r0d0 (1 + g0)
 1 edt 1   r0d0 (1 + g0) 2eyt
+yy0eyt   rrer0frer   yfyf0 eyft (4C)
d0 (1 + g0) edt = d0 edt 1 + r0d0 (1 + g0) 1 erdt + r0d0 (1 + g0) 1 edt 1
 r0d0 (1 + g0) 2eyt + yy0eyt   rrer0frer   yfyf0 eyft
 d0 (1 + g0)eyt (5C)
Assuming
erdt = erft   !qeqt + !d edt
Thus,
d0 (1 + g0) edt = d0 edt 1 + r0d0 (1 + g0) 1 erft   !qeqt + !d edt+ r0d0 (1 + g0) 1 edt 1
 r0d0 (1 + g0) 2eyt + yy0eyt   rrer0frer   yfyf0 eyft
 d0 (1 + g0)eyt (6C)
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d0

(1 + g0)  r0!d
(1 + g0)
 edt = d01 + r0
(1 + g0)
 edt 1 + r0d0
(1 + g0)
erft   r0d0!q(1 + g0)eqt
 d0

(1 + g0) +
r0
(1 + g0)
2

eyt + yy0eyt
 rrer0frer   yfyf0 eyft (7C)
edt = (1 + g0) + r0
(1 + g0)
2   r0!d
edt 1 + r0
(1 + g0)
2   r0!d
erft   r0!q
(1 + g0)
2   r0!d
eqt
  (1 + g0)
3 + r0
(1 + g0)
 
(1 + g0)
2   r0!d
eyt + y (1 + g0) y0
d0
 
(1 + g0)
2   r0!d
eyt
r (1 + g0) rer0
d0
 
(1 + g0)
2   r0!d
 frert   yf (1 + g0) yf0
d0
 
(1 + g0)
2   r0!d
eyft (8C)
Assuming d = (1 + g0)
2   r0!d
edt = (1 + g0) + r0
d
edt 1 + r0
d
erft   r0!qd eqt   (1 + g0)
3 + r0
(1 + g0) d
eyt
y (1 + g0) y0
d0d
eyt   r (1 + g0) rer0
d0d
frert   yf (1 + g0) yf0
d0d
eyft (10C)
edt = a edt 1 + berft + ceyt   deyt   eeqt   f frert   geyft (11C)
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where
a =
(1 + g0) + r0
d
; b =
r0
d
; c =
y (1 + g0) y0
d0d
; d =
(1 + g0)
3 + r0
(1 + g0) d
e =
r0!q
d
; f =
r (1 + g0) rer0
d0d
; g =
yf (1 + g0) y
f
0
d0d
A. 4. Derivation of LM equation
Equate (5A) and (7A)

1  

Ct
Cht 1
1  
1 +
%
St

Mt
Pt
 1
1
Pt
=
1
Cht 1

Ct
Cht 1
  
1 +
%
St

Mt
Pt
 
1 +
%
St

  1
1 + rt

1 +
%
St

(1D)

1  

Ct
Cht 1

Mt
Pt
 1
=
1
Cht 1

1 +
%
St

  1
1 + rt

1 +
%
St

(2D)

1  Ctm
 1
t =

1 +
%
St

  1
1 + rt

1 +
%
St

(3D)

1  Ctm
 1
t =

1 +
%
St

1  1
1 + rt

(4D)
Linearize Eq. (4D)
  
1  
c0
m0
emt =   
1  
c0
m0
ect   %
s0
est + %
s0 (1 + r0)
est+1 + 1
s0 (1 + r0)
ert
150
emt = ect + %
s0
1  

m0
c0
est   %
s0 (1 + r0)
1  

m0
c0
est+1   1  

m0
s0 (1 + r0)
2 c0
ert
(5D)
Recall
ect =  1 + y
c
eyt   r
c
frert + yf
c
eyft (6D)
Substitute Eq. (6D) into Eq. (5D) yields the money market equation:
emt =  1 + y
c
eyt   r
c
frert + yf
c
eyft + %s0 1   m0c0 est   %s0 (1 + r0) 1   m0c0 est+1
 1  

m0
s0 (1 + r0)
2 c0
ert (7D)
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter Two
Yt = min

At'KK

t ; At'NN
1 
t

(1E)
The total cost is:
TCt = wtNt + rtKt (2E)
The marginal cost is:
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MC = wt
dNt
dYt
+ rt
dKt
dYt
(3E)
mct = wt
 
1
(1  )
1
At'n

Yt
At'n
 
1 
!
+ rt
 
1

1
At'k

Yt
At'k
 1 

!
(4E)
Linearize Eq. 4(E)
fmct = w0y0
a20
ewt   w0y0
a20
eat + w0y0
(1  ) a20
eyt   w0y0
(1  ) a20
eat + r0y0
a20
ert
 r0y0
a20
eat + (1  ) r0y0
a20
eyt   (1  ) r0y0
a20
eat
fmct = w0y0
a20
ewt + r0y0
a20
er   w0y0
a20
+
w0y0
(1  ) a20
+
r0y0
a20
+
(1  ) r0y0
a20
eat
w0y0
(1  ) a20
+
(1  ) r0y0
a20
 eyt (5E)
Recall
wt = (1  ) (yt   nt) (6E)
and
ent = (1  )
( + (1  ))eyt + h (   1)
 
1 + y

c ( + (1  ))
eyt 1   rh (   1)
c ( + (1  ))
frert 1
  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c ( + (1  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c ( + (1  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))est (7E)
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Substitute Eq. (6E) and 7E in Eq. (5E) gives the marginal cost equation:
fmct = faeyt   beyt 1 + cfrert + deyft 1   efrert   feyft
+g emt + hest + bert   deat (17)
where
a =

a(1  ) + c   a(1  )
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153
